Friday, September 01, 2017

Canadian breach notification requirements finally published for comment

The Digital Privacy Act amended the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (Canada) to add notification requirements for "breaches of security safeguards", but we've all been anxiously awaiting regulations that will breathe life into the provisions. Finally, the'll be published in the Canada Gazette tomorrow.

The text (below) and the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement do not really contain any surprises, other than a silly requirement that you can only give notice of a breach by email if "the affected individual has consented to receiving information from the organization in that manner." This seems to be a silly nod to Canada's asinine anti-spam law, which would otherwise permit such notices by email.

Here is the regulatory impact analysis statement. You can get the proposed regulation from the Canada Gazette publication:

Canada Gazette Part I, Vol. 151, No. 35 — September 2, 2017 - Breach of Security Safeguards Regulations

Statutory authority

Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act

Sponsoring department

Department of Industry

REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS STATEMENT

(This statement is not part of the Regulations.)

Issues

On June 18, 2015, the Digital Privacy Act (also known as Bill S-4) amended Canada’s private sector privacy law, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA or the Act), in a number of areas. A key change was the establishment of mandatory data breach reporting requirements.

These new provisions are set out in Division 1.1 of PIPEDA, but are not yet in force. The proposed Regulations provide further details pertaining to certain statutory requirements, and prescribe the process for the coming into force of the Regulations.

Background

Legislative framework

PIPEDA applies to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information by every organization in the course of a commercial activity. A commercial activity is defined as any particular transaction, act, or conduct, or any regular course of conduct that is of a commercial character, including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor, membership or fundraising lists.

The federal government may exempt from PIPEDA organizations and/or activities in provinces that have adopted substantially similar privacy legislation. To date, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta have adopted private sector legislation deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA. Further, Ontario, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Nova Scotia have adopted substantially similar legislation with respect to personal health information.

Even in those provinces that have adopted legislation substantially similar to the federal privacy legislation, PIPEDA continues to apply to all interprovincial and international transactions by all organizations subject to the Act in the course of their commercial activities.

PIPEDA also continues to apply in those provinces to federally regulated organizations — “federal works, undertakings or businesses” — such as banks, and telecommunications and transportation companies.

The purpose of PIPEDA is to facilitate growth in electronic commerce through increasing the confidence of Canadians and businesses in the digital economy. The Act employs a principles-based approach that balances the privacy rights of individuals with the legitimate needs of business to use or exchange information.

Mandatory data breach reporting under PIPEDA

With the implementation of Division 1.1 of PIPEDA, organizations that experience a data breach — referred to in the Act as a “breach of security safeguards” — will have certain obligations, as follows:

  • The organization must determine if the breach poses a “real risk of significant harm” to any individual whose information was involved in the breach (“affected individuals”) by conducting a risk assessment. The assessment of risk must consider the sensitivity of the information involved, and the probability that the information will be misused;
  • When the organization considers that a breach is posing a real risk of significant harm, it must notify affected individuals and report to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (the Commissioner) as soon as feasible;
  • The organization must notify any other organization that may be able to mitigate harm to affected individuals; and
  • The organization must maintain a record of any data breach that the organization becomes aware of and provide it to the Commissioner upon request.

Subsection 26(1)(c) of PIPEDA provides the Governor in Council with the authority to make any regulations that are required under the Act. The objective of this regulatory proposal is to provide greater certainty and specificity with respect to certain elements of the Act’s data breach reporting requirements under Division 1.1.

Objectives

The objectives of the proposed Regulations are to

Ensure that all Canadians will receive consistent information about data breaches that pose a risk of significant harm to them.

Ensure that data breach notifications contain sufficient information to enable individuals to understand the significance and potential impact of the breach.

Ensure that the Commissioner receives consistent and comparable information about data breaches that pose a risk of significant harm.

Ensure that the Commissioner is able to provide effective oversight and verify that organizations are complying with the requirements to notify affected individuals of a data breach and to report the breach to the Commissioner.

Description and rationale

With regard to the statutory requirements for data breach reporting under Division 1.1 of PIPEDA, the proposed Regulations will

  • specify the minimum requirements for providing a data breach report to the Commissioner;
  • specify the minimum requirements for notifying affected individuals of a data breach; and
  • confirm the scope and retention period for data breach record-keeping.

Recognizing the vast range of organizations that are subject to PIPEDA, the proposed Regulations are designed to provide maximum flexibility for organizations to fulfill their statutory obligations in a manner that is compatible with their particular circumstances.

Data breach report to the Commissioner

The proposed Regulations list the categories of information that must be contained in a report to the Commissioner, but do not preclude additional information from being provided by the organization, should it believe that the information is pertinent to the Commissioner’s understanding of the incident.

The proposal aligns closely with what is currently recommended in guidance by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) for voluntary data breach reporting, and with what is required for mandatory breach reporting in Alberta (see footnote 1) and in the European Union. (see footnote 2)

The proposed Regulations allow for data breach reports to be submitted with the best information available to the reporting organization at the time. This allows an organization to report breaches within an appropriate time frame, even when all information is not yet available. In these cases, organizations may provide updates to the report at a later date, if further pertinent information becomes available.

Notifying affected individuals of a data breach

The proposed Regulations also list the categories of information that must be contained in a notification to affected individuals. However, organizations are not precluded from providing additional information or designing the notice to suit the intended audience.

This approach provides some certainty to organizations as to what is required as a minimum to comply with the statutory requirements for notification. At the same time, it provides flexibility on the format, design and means of notification. This allows organizations to conduct notifications in line with established practices and expectations of their stakeholders.

The proposed Regulations identify certain commonly used forms of communication as appropriate means of direct notification to individuals, with some caveats to ensure that prompt and secure communication of the information takes place. The proposal also recognizes that notification by other unspecified means of communication may also be appropriate, if they are considered to be secure and prompt, and have been established by the organization as a means of communicating important information to the intended audience.

Circumstances where indirect notification to affected individuals would be permitted, in place of direct notification, have been listed in the proposed Regulations. These circumstances are generally considered by stakeholders to be situations where direct notification to all individuals affected by a breach may be impossible or unfeasible for the breached organization, or where direct notification may not be in the best interest of the individuals themselves. The proposed Regulations also confirm that public announcements or advertisements can be considered as appropriate for indirect notifications. Additional requirements for the use of these communication channels are prescribed to increase the probability that affected individuals will receive the information.

Data breach record-keeping

The proposed Regulations will affirm that the purpose of data breach record-keeping is to facilitate oversight by the Commissioner to ensure compliance with the requirements to report to the Commissioner and notify affected individuals of significant breaches. This in turn will encourage better data security practices by the organizations.

To this end, the proposed Regulations will require organizations to maintain sufficient information in a data breach record to demonstrate that they are tracking data security incidents that result in a breach of personal information. The proposal allows for a broad interpretation of what information would constitute a “record” for the purpose of PIPEDA.

This approach provides protection for any material, regardless of medium or form, that may be provided to the Commissioner in response to a request for data breach records. By not enumerating what constitutes a record in regulations, the Access to Information Act exemption in PIPEDA may be extended to whatever is considered a breach record for the purpose of the Act.

The proposed Regulations specify that organizations must hold data breach records for a minimum period of time; specifically 24 months. This allows the Commissioner to request and review the history of breaches experienced by a particular organization within a two-year window. The proposed time frame reflects the standard practice in most provinces for limitations on initiating civil litigation. It is intended to be a minimum requirement, providing for the retention of data breach records for longer than two years, if an organization’s other obligations, practices or requirements so dictate.

For greater certainty, the proposed Regulations clarify that a data breach report provided to the Commissioner under subsection 10.1(1) of PIPEDA can also be considered a data breach record.

Coming into force

To facilitate compliance with the new data breach reporting regime under PIPEDA, the proposed Regulations provide for implementation at the same time as the related statutory requirements under Division 1.1 of PIPEDA, and allow for a lag period between the publication of final Regulations and their coming into force.

Impacts

Businesses

All organizations subject to PIPEDA will be impacted by the proposed Regulations. However, many will have already implemented data breach reporting practices that align with the proposal, given that it reflects existing best practices established by the OPC and legislative requirements in Alberta.

For those organizations that do not have established processes and procedures for tracking data breaches and reporting accordingly, the proposed Regulations provide for a delayed coming into force date after the publication of the final Regulations.

Consumers

The Canadian marketplace will see a positive impact of the proposed Regulations. Consumers will have the assurance that when they are affected by a data breach posing a risk of significant harm, they will receive the right information in an appropriate manner, regardless of where the breach occurred.

Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada

The responsibility for overseeing compliance with PIPEDA rests with the Commissioner. As part of its oversight of data breach reporting requirements under the Act, the OPC will receive reports on data breaches posing a real risk of significant harm, request data breach records of organizations, at its own discretion, and provide advice and guidance to organizations as to how to comply with their breach reporting obligations under the Act. Where appropriate, the Commissioner will investigate complaints pertaining to suspected contraventions of data breach reporting requirements, and conduct audits of organizational practices in this regard.

As part of its annual report to Parliament on PIPEDA, the OPC may provide information on the extent and nature of reported data breaches in an aggregate and anonymized manner.

Benefits and costs

Social benefits

The proposed Regulations are expected to contribute positively to the privacy and security of individuals. Mandatory breach reporting allows individuals who are affected by a breach to take immediate action to protect themselves against further compromise that may lead to fraud, identity theft, humiliation, loss of employment or other forms of significant harm.

The proposed Regulations are anticipated to help mitigate harm to individuals who are affected by a data breach, and to increase the protection of Canadians’ personal information in general by encouraging better data security practices.

The costs to consumers stemming from data breaches are significant and far-reaching. According to Javelin Strategy and Research, which has done comprehensive annual studies of identity theft in the United States since 2006, a significant proportion of individuals who are impacted by a data breach become victims of identity theft or fraud. Beyond financial costs, the potential for humiliation and loss of opportunity resulting from breaches of personal information also exists, and has been recognized by the courts in Canada.

Mandatory data breach notification under PIPEDA provides an increased level of protection for Canadians and other consumers in the Canadian marketplace by allowing them to take steps to protect themselves from potential harm resulting from that breach.

The proposed Regulations will enhance this protection in a number of ways. By ensuring that all breach notifications contain a core set of information and are provided in an appropriate manner, the proposed Regulations will result in more effective notifications by increasing the probability that affected individuals will receive the information and understand its significance.

A minimum standard for notification also assures Canadians that they can expect a similar approach to notification by all organizations.

Economic benefits

The proposed Regulations will serve to codify existing best practices for data breach reporting and create certainty across the marketplace about how organizations notify individuals affected by a breach. They will also harmonize Canada’s regime for data breach reporting with those of other jurisdictions, reducing the burden of reporting for organizations operating in multiple jurisdictions.

In particular, the proposed Regulations will specify the minimum content of a breach report to the Commissioner, ensuring that reports contain adequate and consistent information to enable the Commissioner’s oversight of the requirement to notify individuals. It ensures that all organizations are held to the same standard when reporting breaches and creates a level playing field for regulated organizations across Canada.

Prescribing the content of notifications to individuals and reports to the Commissioner will align the federal private sector regime for mandatory breach reporting with equivalent provincial legislation, and those of Canada’s major trading partners.

In particular, the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which comes into force in 2018, includes mandatory data breach reporting and requires organizations to include similar information in reports to authorities and to individuals. Also in line with the proposed Regulations, EU companies will be required to keep a record of all data breaches for the purpose of demonstrating due diligence with regard to their reporting obligations.

This alignment is important to Canada–EU trade. PIPEDA is currently deemed to provide an essentially equivalent level of privacy protection to the European Union, which allows for the free flow of personal information from the European Union to Canadian organizations.

It is also an important factor in mitigating compliance costs for organizations that operate in multiple jurisdictions. Many organizations subject to PIPEDA are also required to comply with provincial or international laws, and in the case of a data breach may be required to notify individuals in various jurisdictions. To the extent that the proposed Regulations can align data breach reporting under PIPEDA with requirements in other jurisdictions, this would reduce the burden of notification for many organizations in Canada.

Public security benefits

The proposed Regulations are expected to contribute positively to the security of individuals and the cyber security readiness of Canadian businesses. The regulatory proposal implements statutory requirements to report data breaches, which has been established as an important element of Canada’s cyber security policy.

Experts in data security believe that data breaches are on the rise because organizations are not taking appropriate measures to protect the data they hold. A 2016 report by the Internet Society on the economics of data breaches surmises that the reason for this is twofold: (1) organizations do not bear all the costs of data breach (much is borne by affected individuals), and (2) there is not enough benefit to them in better protecting their users’ data. (see footnote 3) Mandatory breach reporting and record-keeping provide a much needed incentive for organizations to adopt better security practices.

A requirement to maintain records of all breaches for a two-year period will incentivize organizations to track and analyze the impact of all data security incidents. Although many data breaches appear to bear no harm, there may be data security implications. The EY 2016 Global Information Security Survey found that the majority of organizations currently do not increase their cyber security spending after experiencing a breach that does not appear to do any harm. The authors of the report indicate that this is concerning given that cyber criminals often make “test attacks,” lie dormant after a breach, or use a breach as a diversionary tactic to throw organizations off the trail of what they are really up to. (see footnote 4)

The proposed Regulations will also ensure that breach reports to the Commissioner are provided in such a way that incidents can be compared and aggregated to provide a much needed repository of information on data security incidents in Canada; something that experts say will lead to a better shared understanding of cyber security threats. According to the Internet Society report, sharing this information responsibly has a number of benefits: it helps organizations globally improve their data security, helps policy-makers improve policies, helps regulators pursue attackers, and helps the data security industry produce better solutions. (see footnote 5) The report recommends that in order to reduce incidents of data breaches we must increase transparency of the issues through data breach notifications and disclosure.

Consistency in reporting will also allow for metrics to be developed for evidence-based policy-making. Currently there is little data available about the extent and nature of data breaches across the Canadian marketplace, outside of Alberta and the health sector in certain provinces.

Costs

The costs to business directly resulting from the proposed Regulations are expected to be nominal, given that the bulk of the compliance and administrative burden arises from the statutory obligations imposed by the Digital Privacy Act.

Further, the proposed Regulations reflect in large part existing best practices that have been established under the voluntary reporting initiative of the OPC, and under equivalent legislation in certain provinces. Given that these practices have been in place for several years, it is expected that many regulated organizations will have already incorporated them to some degree into their own policies and procedures.

It is anticipated that the flexible approach taken in the proposed Regulations will serve to mitigate the costs of complying with the statutory requirements for notifying individuals. The proposed Regulations allow for organizations to notify individuals indirectly where directly contacting each affected individual may prove unreasonably costly. In these cases, the proposed Regulations allow notification to take place via communication channels that are much more cost effective and efficient, greatly reducing the burden of notification. This may be particularly important for small to medium-sized organizations that may experience a data breach involving a very large number of customers.

The proposed Regulations also allow for organizations to craft notifications in a way that is appropriate for the circumstances and the audience. Though a core set of information is required to be included in notifications to individuals, the proposed Regulations are silent on their format and design.

Consultation

During Parliament’s review of the Digital Privacy Act, many stakeholders representing businesses, consumers and the legal community presented their views on the proposed regime for data breach reporting. The majority were generally supportive of the Bill’s approach, which proposed the use of regulations to provide details on statutory requirements.

Subsequent to the royal assent of the Digital Privacy Act, stakeholders were specifically consulted on the proposed use of regulations. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) published a comprehensive discussion paper that posed a series of specific questions and invited stakeholders to provide their views on how the Government should exercise its regulatory authority. The discussion paper was posted on the Government’s consultation portal (www.consultingcanadians.gc.ca) and was distributed directly to specific stakeholder groups. ISED also held bilateral and multilateral meetings and teleconferences with interested stakeholders to allow them to express their views on the proposed Regulations.

The majority of stakeholders expressed support for the use of regulations to provide more certainty around how certain statutory provisions should be interpreted. A key theme of the responses was the need for flexibility to allow organizations to implement requirements in a manner that fits their particular circumstances. The majority of business representatives were against overly prescriptive regulations and expressed the desire to make use of existing practices to meet their new obligations to the extent possible.

Another theme was the desire for harmonization with established best practices for breach reporting: in particular, existing guidance by the OPC for voluntary breach reporting and mandatory reporting requirements in Alberta and the European Union were cited.

Generally, there was some consensus on the need for regulations to clarify content and format of reports to the Commissioner and notifications to affected individuals. Likewise, there was a general desire to see further direction in regulations on record-keeping requirements. However, the majority of stakeholders indicated that guidelines may be more appropriate than regulations to provide further direction in certain areas, including the use of additional factors to be considered when conducting an assessment of risk and determining which third-party organizations should be informed of a breach.

The OPC concurred that guidance material would be appropriate in these areas to assist regulated organizations and indicated that it would take steps to provide the necessary material.

Several stakeholders called for regulations to speak to the role of encryption in a data breach: specifically, whether a data breach involving encrypted information could be presumed to carry a low risk of harm, effectively providing a “safe harbour” against mandatory notification. The OPC held an opposing view in its response, stating that there are other factors that influence the effectiveness of encryption, including the level of encryption employed and whether or not the encryption key has been compromised. As a result, despite the use of encryption there remains a possibility that personal information could be decrypted, potentially posing a real risk of significant harm to the individual involved.

Some stakeholders, including the OPC, called for data breach reports to include an assessment of the type of harm(s) that may result from the breach, in line with the approach in Alberta. However, the proposed Regulations do not prescribe this as mandatory content in order to address concerns that this type of information is speculative and hypothetical. Stakeholders also argued that it would be difficult for many small and medium-sized organizations to make such an assessment given that they may not have the expertise or resources to do so.

Some organizations proposed that the Regulations should specify which organization is required to undertake notification to individuals in situations where a breach occurs at a service provider or supplier organization. However, the majority held the view that determining which organization is responsible for conducting the notification should be in accordance with the existing Accountability Principle in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA, such that overall responsibility for ensuring compliance rests with the organization having control of the personal information in question. In some cases the term “control” does not necessarily equate to “custody,” but instead refers to overall responsibility for the personal information.

During consultations, many organizations called for a transition period between the publication of the final Regulations and the date of coming into force. They argued this would provide adequate time for organizations to implement required changes to information management systems and to train employees accordingly. Proposed transition periods ranged from 6 to 18 months.

Many organizations also raised concerns about the confidentiality of information contained in breach reports and breach records and the potential for inadvertent public disclosure of sensitive data security details or other proprietary information. It should be noted that the Digital Privacy Act amended the Access to Information Act (ATIA) to create a statutory exemption to the disclosure of any data breach record or data breach report in response to an access to information request. This amendment to the ATIA will come into force with PIPEDA’s other data breach notification and reporting provisions found in Division 1.1 of PIPEDA.

Finally, some organizations called for the Regulations to reduce the scope of the statutory requirement for data breach record-keeping, such that organizations would only be required to keep records of “material” or significant breaches. However, the Government has clearly indicated that the purpose of the record-keeping provisions is to provide the Commissioner with an ability to determine whether or not organizations are tracking all breaches and complying with the requirements to report significant breaches and notify affected individuals.

“One-for-One” Rule

This regulatory proposal is not expected to directly increase the administrative burden on business and is therefore exempt from the “One-for-One” Rule.

Costs to regulated organizations resulting from this regulatory proposal are considered to be nominal, given that the administrative burden arises from the statutory obligations for reporting breaches to the Commissioner, notifying affected individuals, and for record-keeping imposed by the Digital Privacy Act. The proposed Regulations simply provide further specification on those obligations.

Small business lens

The small business lens does not apply because the estimated nationwide cost impact of this regulatory proposal is less than $1 million per year.

Implementation, enforcement and service standards

The proposed Regulations would come into effect at the same time as the statutory requirements pertaining to data breach reporting under Division 1.1 of PIPEDA. The coming into force of the statutory requirements will be established through a subsequent Order in Council once the Regulations are final.

The proposed Regulations will allow for a delayed coming into force after the publication of the Regulations. This will give regulated organizations time to adjust their policies and procedures accordingly and to ensure that systems are in place to track and record all breaches of security safeguards that they experience.

In the meantime, ISED will work with the OPC to identify areas where guidance material is required to assist organizations in interpreting and complying with their new obligations. Particular consideration will be given to providing guidance on conducting a risk assessment.

Enforcement of the proposed Regulations would reflect the existing compliance regime under PIPEDA, whereby the Commissioner is responsible for providing oversight and investigating complaints. Record-keeping plays a key role in the oversight regime — the Commissioner can conduct an audit or launch an investigation based on a record or group of data breach records. The OPC will also use data breach information to increase awareness and understanding of the extent and nature of data breaches in Canada.

New provisions for offences and fines for willful and deliberate contravention of these new requirements were imposed by the Digital Privacy Act. As per other contraventions and offences under PIPEDA, courts are authorized to impose fines pertaining to a contravention of the data breach reporting provisions and to order non-compliant organizations to change practices.

ISED will evaluate the need for amendments to the Regulations on an ongoing basis based on results of data breach reporting that are provided by the OPC, and on informal stakeholder feedback from regulated organizations.

Contact

Charles Taillefer

Director

Privacy and Data Protection Directorate

Marketplace Framework Policy Branch

Strategy and Innovation Policy Sector

Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada

Telephone: 343-291-1774

Email: charles.taillefer@canada.ca

Wednesday, July 26, 2017

British Columbia Commissioner finds that "Creep Catchers" violated province's privacy law

The Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia has just released a very interesting decision and order against the "Surrey Creep Catchers". The Creep Catchers are a loosely affiliated group of people whose stated purpose is to expose online predators, particularly those who will then arrange to meet with children for nefarious purposes. Their modus operandi is to engage with people online, on dating sites and other sites, suggest they are underage and arrange a meeting. They then post video, chat logs, etc. to "expose" or shame the individuals.

In this case, two individuals who were targeted complained to the Information and Privacy Commissioner, who has found that the Creep Catchers violated the Personal Information Protection Act of BC. Most interestingly, the decision found (a) they are an "organization" for the purposes of the Act, (b) they are not engaged in journalism, so that exclusion doesn't help them, and (c) they cannot take advantage of the consent exceptions that apply for legitimate investigations.

A bit troubling is the uncritical following of the definition of journalism used in the Globe24h.com decision of the Federal Court. One will hopefully recall that case was uncontested and the Court simply adopted the restrictive definition put forward by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada:

[18] In order for s. 3(2)(b) to apply, the Organization must be collecting, using, or disclosing personal information for a journalistic purpose. In A.T. v. Globe24h.com, the Federal Court of Canada considered what constitutes journalism for the purposes of the analogous section of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).
The “journalistic” purpose exception is not defined in PIPEDA and it has not received substantive treatment in the jurisprudence. The OPCC submits that the Canadian Association of Journalists has suggested that an activity should qualify as journalism only where its purpose is to (1) inform the community on issues the community values, (2) it involves an element of original production, and (3) it involves a “self-conscious discipline calculated to provide an accurate and fair description of facts, opinion and debate at play within a situation”. Those criteria appear to be a reasonable framework for defining the exception. None of them would
apply to what the respondent has done.

[19] I use the above three criteria to determine whether an organization is carrying out its activities for a journalistic purpose under s. 3(2)(b) of PIPA.


I have cautioned before that one should be cautious in applying Globe24h because the entire court case was unopposed and the Court appears to have simply adopted the OPC's argument without too much critical discussion.

It should also be noted that the BC statute applies to a broader range of "organizations" than PIPEDA, for example. If this case were to arise under the federal statute, I'm not sure the OPC would be able to find jurisdiction.

Here is the summary of the decision prepared by the OIPC:

Two individuals complained that an organization improperly collected, used and disclosed their personal information. The organization had induced each individual to have online communication with a fictitious woman over the age of 18, subsequently conveyed that this decoy was under the age of 16, and arranged a meeting to confront each man for attempting to lure a minor. The organization video-recorded the encounter and disseminated the video on social media. The Acting Commissioner found that the organization collected, used and disclosed the complainants’ personal information contrary to the Personal Information Protection Act because it had not obtained their consent and had no other authority to collect, use or disclose their personal information. He ordered the organization to stop collecting, using and disclosing the complainants’ personal information, to destroy all of their personal information in its custody or under its control, and to ask others who disseminated the information to remove and destroy it as well.​

Wednesday, June 07, 2017

Canadian government pulls the plug on the Canadian Anti-Spam Law private right of action

It's official ... the ability to sue for damages under Canada's Anti-Spam Law (CASL) has been put on ice. An order-in-council dated June 2, 2017 repealed the provision of a previous cabinet order that set the commencement of the private right of action as July 1, 2017. Without that provision, the private right of action will not come into effect.

PC Number: 2017-0580

Date: 2017-06-02

His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Industry, pursuant to section 91 of An Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities, and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Telecommunications Act, chapter 23 of the Statutes of Canada, 2010, amends Order in Council P.C. 2013-1323 of December 3, 2013 by repealing paragraph (c).


The Precis sets out the rationale:

Order Amending Order in Council P.C. 2013-1323 of December 3, 2013 in order to delay the Coming into Force date of sections 47 to 51 and 55 of Canada's Anti-spam Law, which provides for a private right of action, in order to promote legal certainty for numerous stakeholders claiming to experience difficulties in interpreting several provisions of the Act while being exposed to litigation risk.


This gives Canadian business, government and consumers the chance to take a breath and figure out whether this dumpster fire of a law is the right tool for the job.

CASL's civil right of action to be delayed?

I am hearing from reliable sources that the government has agreed to postpone the civil right of action under Canada's Anti-spam Law. The provisions, that were planned to come into effect on July 1, 2017, would mean a person or corporation affected by a CASL contravention can bring a civil lawsuit against the offending person or entity – and seek remedies including monetary compensation and expenses. The maximum penalties are $200 for each commercial electronic message contravention (to a maximum of $1M/day), and $1M for each day on which a software contravention occurs (CASL’s software sections come into force on January 1, 2015).




Very few people in the legal community and in business are in favour of these provisions, and it would appear that the government has been convinced. When the order in council is published, it will appear in the Canada Gazette.

Wednesday, May 10, 2017

Alberta law provides civil remedies for cyberbullying victims

Tort regarding non-consensual distribution of intimate images supplements recent criminal amendments

The Alberta legislature has passed a bill to provide civil remedies for victims of the non-consensual distribution of intimate images. Bill 202, Protecting Victims of Non-Consensual Distribution of Intimate Images Act, creates a new civil cause of action for what has become known “revenge porn” or non-consensual pornography. When the law comes into effect, in August 2017, it will be actionable in the province, without proof of harm, for anyone to distribute “an intimate image of another person knowing that the person depicted in the image did not consent to the distribution, or is reckless as to whether or not that person consented to the distribution”. The statute builds upon the criminal provisions for such actions added to the Criminal Code in Bill C-13 and closely follows the similar statute in Manitoba, the Intimate Image Protection Act.

An “intimate image” is defined as an image or video in which the person depicted is nude or includes the breasts, genitals or anal region, or depicts explicit activity. It is further defined with reference to the expectation of privacy that existed at the time the image was created or distributed:

(ii) which was recorded in circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of that image, and

(iii) if the image has been distributed, in which the person depicted in the image retained a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time it was distributed;

Importantly, that expectation of privacy is not necessarily lost if the image was taken by another person or was given to another person where it was not to be further distributed:

Expectation of privacy
5 In an action for the distribution of an intimate image without consent, the person depicted in the image does not lose the expectation of privacy in respect of the image if that person
(a) consented to another person recording the images, or

(b) provided the image to another person,

in circumstances where that other person knew or ought reasonably to have known that the image was not distributed to any other person.

The bill also contains a public interest defence, which is similar to that found in the Criminal Code for other pornography and obscenity offences. Also of note, if the defendant in an action under the new law is a child, the statute specifically deems that the parent of the defendant will not be jointly and severally liable unless the parent “directly participated” in the distribution of the image.

Friday, March 10, 2017

Privacy and the use of census information for population health research

Professor Teresa Scassa has a very interesting comment on her blog about a recent case from the Federal Court of Canada, O’Grady v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FC 167. Her comment is here: Recent Federal Court Decision Examines Privacy and the Census.

The case itself is a judicial review of a decision of the Chief of Statistics to enter into an agreement with McGill University’s Faculty of Medicine to conduct a study examining perinatal outcomes in Canada. This sort of research collaboration and data matching happens all the time, but seldom is it objected-to and the discussions do not often end up in front of the courts.

The context, from the decision:

[3] In 2011, Statistics Canada and McGill entered into a Letter of Agreement to conduct a study that would assess infant mortality and newborn health by examining perinatal outcomes in Canada according to risk factors related to socioeconomic position, ethno-cultural background, and environmental exposure [Study]. In connection with the Study, record linkages were used to link information from the national birth record database and the 1996 and 2006 censuses. In order to minimize the privacy intrusion, the record linkages were performed in accordance with s 6 of the Statistics Act, RSC 1985, c S-19 [Statistics Act] by Statistics Canada employees, or deemed employees, and the composite records were stripped of direct personal identifiers before they were made accessible to McGill. The composite records were also restricted to Statistics Canada’s premises. Additionally, the usage of the record linkages was publicly posted on the Statistics Canada website.

The applicant complained to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, who concluded that the applicant's personal information had not been improperly used.

[7] The Privacy Commissioner agreed that the Applicant’s census information met the definition of personal information, as defined by s 3 of the Statistics Act. Additionally, the Privacy Commissioner found that usage of census information in the Study was beyond the scope of the purposes for which it was collected, which is prohibited under s 7 of the Statistics Act. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the Applicant’s information had actually been used in the Study as her information had been excluded. Furthermore, even if the Applicant’s information had been used, Statistics Canada had the authority to do so under the Statistics Act. Consequently, the Privacy Commissioner found that the Applicant’s complaint was not well-founded.

The Court, in reviewing the decision by the Chief of Statistics, found that it was lawful as the use of the census data in this manner is consistent with the purpose for which it was originally collected.

[68] There is no doubt that census information is personal information, so the issue in this case is whether it was used “for a use consistent” with the “purpose for which it was obtained or complied….”

[69] The Supreme Court of Canada set out the “consistent use” test in Bernard, above:

[31] A use need not be identical to the purpose for which information was obtained in order to fall under s. 8(2) (a) of the Privacy Act; it must only be consistent with that purpose. As the Federal Court of Appeal held, there need only be a sufficiently direct connection between the purpose and the proposed use, such that an employee would reasonably expect that the information could be used in the manner proposed.

(emphasis in original)


[70] It is clear that Statistics Canada could not have contemplated the Study at the time of either the 1996 census or the 2006 census. Hence, the information collected by those censuses was not obtained specifically for the Study. However, the purpose of the Study is to compile and analyse statistics related to the health and welfare of Canadians, so that it complies with the purpose of the censuses and with Statistics Canada’s mandate.


The application was dismissed, but the Court noted it was premature overall:

[86] The real problem with this application is that it is premature. The Study has not yet been released or used. The Applicant speculates that personal information will be used and disclosed, but has produced no convincing evidence to support that position. Whatever I have said in this application, which is based solely upon the record before me, should not prevent anyone whose personal information is inappropriately used or disclosed from bringing the matter before the Court in the future.

Friday, February 10, 2017

Nova Scotia Appeals Court: No privacy and defamation double-dip damages

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, in Marson v Nova Scotia, 2017 NSCA 17 has affirmed the decision of the NS Supreme Court, which found that you don't get to double-dip on damages if essentially the same is grounded in invasion of privacy and defamation. The unanimous Court reasoned:

[27] The trial judge was alive to the potential to award damages for “Breach of Privacy/Intrusion upon seclusion”. She discussed the issue of whether there was any need to rely upon an Ontario case, Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (CanLII), which recognized the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. In Jones the Court made an award based on the tort of invasion of privacy, or intrusion upon seclusion. That case referenced the fact that one who intentionally intrudes upon the seclusion of another in his private affairs is subject to liability for invasion of privacy if the invasion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. A reasonable person, in the context of that tort, would find it highly offensive to have records such as health records, or in the context of the present case, confidential policing/corrections information disseminated.

[28] The Jones case made it clear that the damages for such a tort were in the category of “symbolic” or “moral” damages where a plaintiff suffered no provable pecuniary loss. Here, the trial judge correctly pointed out that while in Trout Point Lodge Ltd. v. Handshoe, 2012 NSSC 245 (CanLII) it was made clear that the court could award damages for a tort of intrusion upon seclusion, it was not necessary in the present case. She said:

175 … I do not need to undertake that analysis. The actions complained of under this heading are, essentially, the same actions underpinning the defamation claim, for which I have already awarded complete damages. The factors noted in par. 87 of Jones have already been considered in that award. It would be inappropriate to make further awards. …

[29] I agree with the trial judge’s approach on this issue. The approach argued by the appellant would have resulted in double recovery for the same delict. The trial judge’s comments make it clear that the intrusion of seclusion was subsumed within the other heads of damages.

A claim can be both rooted in privacy and defamation, but your compensation is for the harm itself and not multiplied by the different torts you can claim.

Tuesday, February 07, 2017

Did the Canadian Federal Court take the first step to a "right to be forgotten" with a global take-down order?

This past week, the Federal Court of Canada released a very interesting decision in A.T. v. Globe24h.com, 2017 FC 114, which seems to be the first step towards a Canadian "right to be forgotten". (You may recall that I generally don't think such a right exists in Canada (You'd better forget the right to be forgotten in Canada). The decision includes an order that purports to tell a non-Canadian what information can be published on the internet globally.

The decision is generally unsatisfying in a number of ways. But first here's the background: The Applicant, identified only as A.T., registered a complaint with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada that a Romanian website was hosting and making available an Alberta Labour Board decision that he did not want to be associated with. An internet search of his name would turn up this decision, hosted by Globe24h. He wanted it taken down. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) had previously investigated a number of complaints against the outfit and issued a finding. Essentially, the OPC had found that the site scraped decisions from Canadian legal, courts and tribunal websites and made them searchable on the internet. Most of these tribunals and courts made these records available online, but restricted them from being indexed and fully searchable. The business model of the site seems to be that they will promptly take down decisions -- presumably those not favourable to individuals -- if the individual paid a processing fee. The OPC had found this was a violation of Canada's Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.

In the case before the Federal Court, only the complainant and the OPC appeared. As a result, the record is one-sided and there was not a complete, adversarial analysis of all the issues to be considered. Our legal system is premised upon having opposing sides present their best arguments and best evidence before a Court. This decision only includes one side and no interveners who may have helped the court get a more balanced view. It does appear that the Court generally accepted the arguments put forward by the OPC, including hearsay related to the dialogue that OPC had with Globe24h (but which it declined to have with the Court).

The Court relied on, among other authorities, the Equustek v. Google decision from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and for which a decision is pending, to support its ability to issue a mandatory order against an entity with no presence in Canada. This decision may be reversed.

Secondly, because there was nobody to present the other side, there was no discussion about the impact of freedom of expression or the right to information on the case. The Court concluded that because the original case was available online, but not indexed, removing it from Globe24h would not have any real impact. And because the site's purpose was concluded to be mostly mercenary, it could not take advantage of the exclusion given to exclusively journalistic reports. In fact, the Court determined that the website's approach was not "appropriate" for the purposes of s. 5(3) of PIPEDA, which reads:

Appropriate purposes

(3) An organization may collect, use or disclose personal information only for purposes that a reasonable person would consider are appropriate in the circumstances.


Here's the judge's reasoning on that point:

[75] I agree with the OPCC that a reasonable person would not consider the respondent to have a bona fide business interest. In making this argument, the Commissioner relies on the Canadian Judicial Council’s (CJC) Model Policy for Access to Court Records in Canada (Model Policy) and the OPCC’s own guidance document to federal administrative tribunals. The CJC Model Policy discourages decisions that are published online to be indexed by search engines as this would prevent information from being available when the purpose of the search is not to find court records. The policy recognizes that a balance must be struck between the open courts principle and increasing online access to court records where the privacy and security of participants in judicial proceedings will be at issue.

[76] The CJC has struck a balance by advising courts to prevent judgments from being discovered unintentionally through search engines. To this end, the CJC has recommended that judgments published online should not be indexed by search engines. The OPCC notes that CanLII and other court and tribunal websites generally follow the CJC’s Model Policy and prevent their decisions from being indexed by search engines through web robot exclusion protocols and other means. Indeed, the Federal Court has taken such measures to prevent our decisions from being indexed. That does not bar anyone from visiting the Federal Court website and conducting a name search. But it does prevent the cases from being listed in a casual web search. The respondent’s actions result in needless exposure of sensitive personal information of participants in the justice system via search engines.


The Court agreed with the OPC's submissions that the "journalism" exception doesn't apply in the case either. In doing so, the Court followed the reasoning of the Alberta Court of Appeal in United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABCA 130, which was affirmed on other grounds by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2013 SCC 62.

[67] The respondent has claimed in communications with the OPCC that his purposes in operating Globe24h.com should be considered exclusively journalistic. Should the Court accept that claim, Part 1 of PIPEDA does not apply to his activities because the personal information collected, used or disclosed falls under the exception provided by paragraph 4(2)(c) of PIPEDA.

[68] The “journalistic” purpose exception is not defined in PIPEDA and it has not received substantive treatment in the jurisprudence. The OPCC submits that the Canadian Association of Journalists has suggested that an activity should qualify as journalism only where its purpose is to (1) inform the community on issues the community values, (2) it involves an element of original production, and (3) it involves a “self-conscious discipline calculated to provide an accurate and fair description of facts, opinion and debate at play within a situation ”. Those criteria appear to be a reasonable framework for defining the exception. None of them would apply to what the respondent has done.

[69] The Alberta Court of Appeal interpreted similar statutory language in Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5: United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABCA 130 (CanLII), [2012] AJ No 427, aff’d 2013 SCC 62 (CanLII), [2013] 3 SCR 733 [United Food]. Specifically, in considering the adjective “journalistic”, the Court of Appeal noted that “it is unreasonable to think that the Legislature intended it to be so wide as to encompass everything within the phrase “freedom of opinion and expression””: United Food, above, at para 56. Further, the Court noted that “[n]ot every piece of information posted on the Internet qualifies [as journalism]”: United Food, above, at para 59.

[70] In my view, the respondent’s claimed purpose “to make law accessible for free on the Internet” on Globe24h.com cannot be considered “journalistic”. In this instance, there is no need to republish the decisions to make them accessible as they are already available on Canadian websites for free. The respondent adds no value to the publication by way of commentary, additional information or analysis. He exploits the content by demanding payment for its removal.

[71] The evidence indicates that the respondent’s primary purpose is to incentivize individuals to pay to have their personal information removed from the website. A secondary purpose, until very recently, was to generate advertising revenue by driving traffic to his website through the increased exposure of personal information in search engines. There is no evidence that the respondent’s intention is to inform the public on matters of public interest.

[72] Even if the respondent’s activities could be considered journalistic in part, the exemption under paragraph 4(2)(c) only applies where the information is collected, used or disclosed exclusively for journalistic purposes. It is clear from the record that Globe24h.com’s purposes extend beyond journalism.


While this case is very interesting and the first in Canada to approach a "right to be forgotten", I would caution against assuming that it is a strong precedent for Canadian law. Unfortunately, it appears all the argument and evidence was one-sided. The case raises some very interesting, very important and nuanced issues. We really would have benefited from a full presentation of all arguable positions, particularly those related to freedom of expression and the appropriateness of global takedown orders.

Here's the final order from the Court:

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. It is declared that the Respondent, Sebastian Radulescu, contravened the Personal Information Protection and Electronics Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 by collecting, using and disclosing on his website, www.Globe24h.com (“Globe24h.com”), personal information contained in Canadian court and tribunal decisions for inappropriate purposes and without the consent of the individuals concerned;

2. The Respondent, Sebastian Radulescu, shall remove all Canadian court and tribunal decisions containing personal information from Globe24h.com and take the necessary steps to remove these decisions from search engines caches;

3. The Respondent, Sebastian Radulescu, shall refrain from further copying and republishing Canadian court and tribunal decisions containing personal information in a manner that contravenes the Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5;

a) The Respondent, Sebastian Radulescu, shall pay the Applicant damages in the amount of $5000;

b) The Applicant is awarded costs in the amount of $300; and

c) The style of cause is amended to substitute the initials “A.T.” for the name of the applicant.

Thursday, February 02, 2017

My testimony on the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act

Earlier this week, I was invited to testify before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics as part of their study of the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act (here's the notice of meeting: House of Commons Committees - ETHI (42-1) - Notice of Meeting - Number 042 (Official Version)).

The Act is one of the more problematic portions of the Anti-terrorism Act of 2015, which was passed by the previous government. The new government has said they'd fix it, but it it unclear what they would fix.

I was pleased to testify alongside Laura Tribe of OpenMedia and David Elder, who spoke on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association Privacy and Access Law Section.

The audio of the full session is here, and below is my opening statement:

Thank you to the committee and to the chair for the opportunity to speak with you today about this very important subject.

If I may introduce myself: I am a privacy lawyer practicing with McInnes Cooper in Halifax. I’ve been practicing law in this area for more than fifteen years and I have had the benefit of advising clients on a full range of privacy, access to information and technology issues for that time. I work with clients who regularly have contact with the police and with national security authorities looking for information, both through regular lawful channels and -- shall we say -- informal channels.

I am here in my personal capacity, so I am not speaking for any of my clients, any associations that I am a member of nor on behalf of my firm.

This committee has a very important opportunity and I think we are at a turning point in global history. We have the chance, right now, to take a deep breath, take a step back and ask some very important questions. Who are we as Canadians and what do we want to be? What kind of country do we want to live in and are we taking positive steps to make it happen?

Looking south of the border, I am very mindful of a phrase I first heard said by William Binnie after he left the National Security Agency. He was afraid that what he was being asked to create within that organization was “turnkey totalitarianism”. If you build an intrusive tool for the most benevolent institution, you can have faith in the people you build it for but you can’t be sure that it will not fall into the wrong hands. Setting aside the cynicism I have developed over the last dozen years, even if you absolutely believe what the leaders of our national security and policing agencies say to you, you can’t be sure that their replacements will have the same good faith and concern about the rights of citizens. You can’t be sure about the good faith and commitment to Canadian values of the next prime minister. The new US administration has at its disposal the most significant surveillance apparatus ever assembled, and it’s being built with Canadian collaboration. This committee needs to look at the “here and now”, but also has to be looking over the horizon for what may come next. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2015 are the foundation that massive abuse of Canadians’ rights may be built on.

We also need to look at whether any of this is really necessary or proportional. Look at what we have here and what is going on. On one hand, we’ve seen that CSIS, with the assistance of the Department of Justice lawyers, has lied to courts in order to feed CSIS’ databases.

And we’ve also seen that CSIS has refused to delete the information they unlawfully retain.

And we’ve most recently seen that CSIS has been working to try to justify their data mining practices and has been looking for more data to put into that data base.

And, on the other hand, we have the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which is a privacy disaster. The privacy of Canadians was previously protected by information silos. You knew that information about your Canada Pension Plan or EI claims would not be used for another purpose unless the (relatively weak) hurdles built into the Privacy Act were complied with or unless a judge determined it was appropriate in those circumstances. Now we have a system where CSIS can ask any government department for virtually any data (as long as they think it is relevant), can get it and it’s no longer covered by the same protection of the originating institution.

They may think “people who visit bad guys are probably bad guys, so let’s get all the visitor logs from Corrections Canada”. Then “let’s match that up against Canada Border Services records of people leaving and returning to Canada.” And why not “all the records of people receiving EI?” And then everyone’s tax returns to see who has donated to muslim charities? This law would allow CSIS or the RCMP to collect, in one massive database, all the information that every other government department has about you.

SCISA does not contain any limit on what organizations like CSIS or the RCMP can do once they build these databases.

There is NO limit on how much information can be transferred between any government department and any of those institutions listed in the schedule to the Act. And all of this happens in the shadows. As parliamentarians, all you get to know are the evasive non-answers given to you. There is no oversight and no accountability. This is essentially a blank cheque giving national security agencies access some of the most sensitive information about Canadians. This is a real problem and the Act should be repealed.

I would also highlight that the presence of s. 9 should raise a red flag: “9 No civil proceedings lie against any person for their disclosure in good faith of information under this Act.” If a statute has to provide immunity for otherwise unlawful conduct, we should be very careful about authorizing that conduct and should be very careful about granting that immunity.

I look forward to your questions.

Tuesday, December 13, 2016

Parliamentary Committee calls for reform of federal Privacy Act

Yesterday, the Parliament of Canada Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics has issued the result of its study of the Privacy Act. The Act, which regulates the collection, use and disclosure of personal information by federal public bodies, is antiquated and is in dire need of reform. You'll see in the Report that I appeared as a witness, generally backing the recommendations of the Privacy Commissioner and the Canadian Bar Association.

Many of the recommendations are not new and have been ignored by a succession of federal governments. We'll see what happens now ...

Here, in short, are the recommendations:

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1

a) That the purpose clause in section 2 of the Privacy Act be expanded to reinforce the quasi-constitutional nature of privacy rights by including generally accepted and technologically neutral privacy principles similar to those in contained in the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, including accountability; identifying purposes; limiting collection; limiting use, disclosure, and retention; accuracy; safeguards; openness; individual access; and challenging compliance.

b) That the Privacy Act be modified to clarify that the privacy principles in the amended purpose clause shall guide the interpretation of the Act.

RECOMMENDATION 2

That the definition of “personal information” in section 3 of the Privacy Act be amended to ensure that it be technologically neutral and that it include unrecorded information.

RECOMMENDATION 3

That the Government of Canada define metadata in the Privacy Act, in a technologically neutral way and with an emphasis on the information it can reveal about an individual.

RECOMMENDATION 4

That the Privacy Act be amended to require that all information sharing under paragraphs 8(2)(a) and (f) of the Privacy Act be governed by written agreements and that these agreements include specified elements.

RECOMMENDATION 5

That the Privacy Act be amended to create an explicit requirement that new or amended information-sharing agreements be submitted to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada for review, and that existing agreements should be reviewable by the Privacy Commissioner upon request.

RECOMMENDATION 6

a) That the Privacy Act be amended to create an explicit requirement that departments be transparent about the existence of any information-sharing agreements.

b) That the Privacy Act be amended to require, except in appropriate circumstances, the publication of the content of information-sharing agreements between departments or with other governments.

RECOMMENDATION 7

That the Privacy Act be amended to create an explicit requirement for institutions to safeguard personal information with appropriate physical, organizational and technological measures commensurate with the level of sensitivity of the data.

RECOMMANDATION 8

That the Privacy Act be amended to set out clear consequences for failing to safeguard personal information.

RECOMMENDATION 9

That the Privacy Act be amended to create an explicit requirement for government institutions to report material breaches of personal information to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada in a timely manner.

RECOMMENDATION 10

That the Privacy Act be amended to create an explicit requirement for government institutions to notify affected individuals of material breaches of personal information, except in appropriate cases, provided that the notification does not compound the damage to the individuals.

RECOMMENDATION 11

That section 4 of the Privacy Act be amended to explicitly require compliance with the criteria of necessity and proportionality in the context of any collection of personal information, consistent with other privacy laws in effect in Canada and abroad.

RECOMMENDATION 12

That the Privacy Act be amended to clarify that a recipient federal institution that receives personal information through information sharing with another federal institution is collecting personal information within the meaning of section 4 of the Privacy Act, and must meet the criteria of necessity and proportionality that apply to the collection of personal information.

RECOMMENDATION 13

That section 6 of the Privacy Act be amended so as to explicitly require compliance with the criteria of necessity and proportionality in the context of any retention of personal information.

RECOMMENDATION 14

That the Privacy Act be amended to set clear rules governing the collection and protection of personal information that is collected on the internet and through social media.

RECOMMENDATION 15

a) That the Government of Canada strengthen the oversight of privacy rights by adopting an order-making model with clear and rigorously defined parameters.

b) That, in order to ensure the most effective use of resources, the Government of Canada explore ways of finding efficiencies, by, among other things, combining the adjudicative functions of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada.

RECOMMENDATION 16

That the Government of Canada further examine the possibility of expanding judicial recourse and remedies under the Privacy Act.

RECOMMENDATION 17

That the Privacy Act be amended to include a requirement for government institutions to conduct privacy impact assessments for new or significantly amended programs and submit them to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada in a timely manner.

RECOMMENDATION 18

That the Privacy Act be amended to require federal government institutions to consult with Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada on draft legislation and regulations with privacy implications before they are implemented.

RECOMMENDATION 19

That the Privacy Act be amended to explicitly confer the Privacy Commissioner with:

a) the authority to conduct, on his own initiative, research and studies on issues of public importance, and

b) a mandate to undertake public education and awareness activities.

RECOMMENDATION 20

That the Privacy Act be amended to require an ongoing five-year parliamentary review.

RECOMMENDATION 21

That section 64 of the Privacy Act be amended to create an exemption from confidentiality requirements to provide the Privacy Commissioner with the discretionary authority to report proactively on government privacy issues where he considers it in the public interest to do so.

RECOMMENDATION 22

That the Privacy Act be amended to expand the ability of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to collaborate with other data protection authorities and review bodies on audits and investigations of shared concern in connection with Privacy Act issues.

RECOMMENDATION 23

That section 32 of the Privacy Act be amended to grant the Privacy Commissioner discretion to discontinue or decline complaints on specified grounds, including when the complaint is frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith, and that the Commissioner’s decision to discontinue or decline a complaint be subject to a right of appeal by the complainant.

RECOMMENDATION 24

That reporting requirements on broader privacy issues dealt with by federal institutions be reinforced by requiring the addition of a descriptive element so as to make the information in the reports accessible and relevant.

RECOMMENDATION 25

That there be specific transparency requirements for lawful access requests from agencies involved in law enforcement.

RECOMMENDATION 26

That the Government of Canada explore extending the scope of the Privacy Act to all federal government institutions, including ministers’ offices and the Prime Minister’s Office.

RECOMMENDATION 27

That the Government of Canada consider extending the right of access to personal information to foreign nationals.

RECOMMENDATION 28

That the Government of Canada examine the possibility of limiting exemptions to access to personal information requests under the Privacy Act.‎