The Information and PrivacyCommissioner of British Columbia just found that the City of Richmond in the BC
lower mainland broke the law when it installed ultra-high-definition cameras in
public places that capture faces, licence plates, and other identifiers. The
Commissioner recommended that they take down the cameras and delete all the
recordings. The City said “nope”, so the Commissioner issued a binding order
for them to stop collection, delete recordings, and disband the system.
This is definitely going to court.
The City of Richmond issued a statement saying they think it is lawful and
appropriate, and are looking to have the legality of all of this determined by
the Courts. I think that’s a good thing … the more clarity we have from the
superior courts on the interpretation of our privacy laws, the better.
I should note that while these
laws are generally consistent from province to province, there is a big
variation on how police services are delivered. Not all of the conclusions of
this finding will necessarily be applicable in all other provinces or
municipalities.
The City of Richmond in British Columbia began field testing its “Public Safety Camera System” – or PSCS – in early 2025 at the intersection of Minoru Boulevard and Granville Avenue.
The City’s stated sole purpose
was to collect and disclose video footage to the RCMP to assist in
identifying criminal suspects. That point—sole purpose—is central to the
Commissioner’s analysis. There was no other rationale for the City of Richmond
to put up these cameras in these locations.
Operationally, the system involved
multiple high-resolution cameras capturing:
- licence plate numbers,
- high-definition images of vehicle occupants,
- pedestrians,
- vehicle identifying features, and
- location/time information tied to the intersection.
The cameras recorded continuously,
and the City retained footage for 48 hours before deletion.
The field test included
capabilities like licence plate recognition, pan-tilt-zoom variants,
panoramic/multi-sensor configurations, and other detection features; the City
confirmed it did not use facial recognition or built-in audio recording
during field testing, though some cameras had those capabilities.
The City’s goal for the field test
was essentially procurement-and-design: evaluate camera tech, decide numbers
and placement, assess performance in different conditions, and confirm the PSCS
could generate “usable” footage for law enforcement use later.
Under BC FIPPA, public bodies can’t collect personal information just because it seems useful. Collection has to fit within a listed authorization—most importantly here, s. 26.
The Commissioner situates that
within a broader privacy-protective approach: privacy rights are treated as
quasi-constitutional, and public bodies should only compromise privacy where
there’s a compelling state interest.
Richmond relied on three
possible authorities:
- s. 26(b) (law enforcement),
- s. 26(c) (authorized program/activity +
necessity),
- s. 26(e) (planning/evaluating a
program/activity).
The Commissioner rejected all
three, finding there simply was not legal authority for the collection of
personal information – and without legal authority, there’s no lawful
collection.
Richmond first said they were authorized under s. 26(b):
26 A public body may collect personal information only if
(b) the information is collected for the purposes of law enforcement,
Note the use of the word “only”.
Unless section 26 permits it, a public body cannot collect personal
information.
Richmond’s theory was
straightforward: the definition of “law enforcement” includes policing,
and the PSCS was meant to support policing by helping identify suspects—so it’s
“for law enforcement.” That was their alleged purpose.
The Commissioner accepted there’s
a connection: the information might be used by the RCMP in policing. But the
Commissioner says that’s not the end of the inquiry, because the collector
is the City—and the City must have a law enforcement mandate of its
own to rely on s. 26(b).
This is a recurring theme in
Canadian privacy oversight: a public body can’t bootstrap a law-enforcement
collection power merely because another entity with a law-enforcement mandate
might find the data useful.
The City may pay for law
enforcement, and it may provide resources to law enforcement but they do not
have a lawful law enforcement mandate.
The report describes three
arguments Richmond advanced:
- RCMP mandate should be imputed to the City
(because the City “provides” policing by contracting with the RCMP to do
it).
- The City has a mandate to collect information for
the RCMP.
- The City has its own independent mandate to police
through the cameras.
The Commissioner’s response is
pretty technical: under the Police Act and the Municipal Police Unit
Agreement framework, municipalities fund and resource policing, but
policing authority and law enforcement functions remain with the police,
operating independently of the municipality.
He underscores that the Police Act
sets out specific ways a municipality provides policing—such as establishing a
municipal force or contracting with the RCMP—and “running a surveillance camera
system for the police to use” is not among those statutory options.
He also points to the RCMP’s
peace-officer functions and the Municipal Police Unit Agreement
structure as vesting law enforcement responsibilities in the RCMP, not the
City, and he reads the legislative set-up as intentionally keeping policing
independent from municipal control.
So this argument advanced by
the City failed: the City lacked the necessary law-enforcement mandate, so
it could not collect under s. 26(b)—even if the police might later use the
footage.
Section 26(c) is the classic
“public body operational authority” provision: even if a statute doesn’t
explicitly say “collect this kind of personal information,” a public body can
collect personal information if it is both:
- directly related to an authorized program or
activity, and
- necessary for that program or activity.
Richmond framed its program as essentially: an intersection camera program to identify criminal suspects following criminal incidents, pointing to broad service powers under its Community Charter.
But the Commissioner rejected that
program characterization as “authorized,” because—again—of the Police Act
structure. In the Commissioner’s view, “collecting evidence to identify
criminals that the RCMP may rely on” isn’t part of how the City is authorized
to provide policing services or resources under the Police Act framework.
So, the analysis fails at the
first step: if the underlying “program” isn’t authorized, 26(c) can’t save the
collection.
The report goes further and addresses necessity. The Commissioner emphasizes that the City’s record was limited in establishing that: (a) unresolved crime was “real, substantial, and pressing,” (b) existing measures were ineffective, or (c) less intrusive means had been seriously examined.
He characterizes the intrusion
into privacy as “vast,” relative to the limited evidentiary foundation offered
to justify necessity.
The net effect was that the
Commissioner was not satisfied that the City demonstrated that mass capture
of high-definition identifying footage from “tens of thousands of people each
day” who had nothing to do with any sort of crime was necessary for the
purported municipal activity.
Richmond also argued: the field test is just planning and evaluation, and s. 26(e) specifically authorizes collection necessary for planning/evaluating a program.
The Commissioner’s treatment of
26(e) is crisp: 26(e) presupposes that the program being planned or evaluated
is otherwise authorized. You can plan or evalue an authorized program,
but if the program ain’t authorized, you can’t collect personal information to
plan or evaluate it. Richmond itself largely accepted that proposition, and the
Commissioner agreed.
Because the Commissioner had
already found the PSCS was not authorized under 26(b) or 26(c), Richmond could
not rely on 26(e) to do “planning” for an unauthorized program.
It makes sense that you can’t use
the planning/evaluation clause as an end-run around the core requirement of
lawful authority. Otherwise, everything under the sun could be said to be for
planning or evaluation.
FIPPA generally requires notice of purpose and authority when collecting personal information. Richmond tried to avoid notice by invoking s. 27(3)(a)—the idea that a notice is not required where the information is “about law enforcement.”
The Commissioner gives two responses.
First: the City couldn’t rely on law enforcement as its underlying authorization in the first place—so that alone undermined the attempt to rely on the exception.
Second, and more fact-specific: during the field testing phase, the City had confirmed it was not using the information for actual public safety or enforcement purposes—only to test and evaluate camera technical capabilities.
So even reading “about law enforcement” broadly, the Commissioner questioned whether the testing-phase collection qualified as “about law enforcement,” because it would not be used to enforce any laws, and there was no compelling enforcement purpose weighing against notice.
Richmond did install signs, but the Commissioner describes them as a “courtesy” and finds them legally inadequate.
The sign said “PUBLIC SAFETY
CAMERA TESTING / FIELD TESTING IN PROGRESS AT THIS INTERSECTION” with contact
information for the City’s Director of Transportation.
The Commissioner’s critique is
twofold:
- First there was a Content deficiency: the
signs did not clearly notify people that cameras were recording and
collecting personal information, and did not include the purposes and
legal authority for collection as required by s. 27(2).
- And secondly there was a Placement deficiency:
signage was vehicle-focused, placed for eastbound and westbound
approaches, but did not address entries from other directions and did not
notify pedestrians—despite the system’s capacity to capture pedestrians
and pan widely, including multi-direction recording.
The Commissioner’s conclusion is
direct: the City did not adequately notify individuals when it collected their
personal information during field testing.
The report notes that disclosure under s. 33(2) generally depends on lawful collection in the first place, and because the collection lacked authority, the City could not rely on “consistent purpose” disclosure to the RCMP for evaluation.
On security, the Commissioner
acknowledges the City described a reasonably robust set of safeguards, and that
even where collection is unlawful, the City still has a duty under s. 30 to
protect personal information in its custody or control.
But safeguards don’t cure lack of
authority. They are necessary, not sufficient.
The OIPC’s recommendations were
blunt:
- stop collecting personal information through the
PSCS,
- delete all recordings, and
- disband the equipment.
Richmond advised it would not
comply, and the Commissioner issued Order F26-01, requiring immediate
compliance and written evidence of compliance by a specific date.
My takeaway is that the Commissioner’s reasoning is primarily structural and jurisdictional: the City tried to create a surveillance-for-police capability, but the Commissioner reads BC’s legal framework as drawing a hard line between municipal services and police law-enforcement authority—particularly when the activity is mass surveillance in public space.
If you’re a public body
contemplating “pilot projects” with high-capability cameras, the report is a
reminder that planning provisions don’t let you pilot an unauthorized
program, and that “law enforcement adjacent” doesn’t equal “law enforcement
authorized.”
For a public body, every
collection of personal information has to be directly authorized by law. It’s
worth noting that the “law enforcement” provision in most public sector privacy
laws is wide enough to drive a truck through. The RCMP in Richmond could have
paid for and put up those cameras all over the place, since they have a law
enforcement mandate.
Criminal courts are pretty adept
at dealing with privacy invasions on a case-by-case basis using section 8 of
the Charter, but we actually need a better way to to evaluate proportionality,
necessity and appropriateness when it comes to proposed police programs that
hoover up data on hundreds, thousands or maybe millions of innocent people in
the name of “law enforcement”.
It’ll be interesting
to see how the courts deal with this.
