Did you know that, in Canada, a justice of the peace who has never attended law school can potentially authorize police to obtain years of your private emails, text messages, photographs and other information stored in your online accounts?
And that these investigative powers aren't necessarily reserved for serious crimes such as murder, terrorism, organized crime, or even offences that could send someone to prison?
Under the Criminal Code, some of these powers can potentially be used to investigate relatively trivial federal offences. Things like playing soccer in the wrong place, having a picnic where you're not supposed to, or walking too many dogs in certain federal parks.
And here's another thing. The police can obtain these orders without you knowing about the application. And depending on the circumstances, you might never find out that your personal information was handed over.
And this is particularly relevant to the debate we're having right now over Bill C-22, the federal government's latest lawful access legislation. The government wants police to be able to obtain subscriber information on the lower threshold of "reasonable grounds to suspect," rather than the more demanding "reasonable grounds to believe." And the government's justification is that subscriber information is supposedly less sensitive and less privacy-intrusive than the information obtained through a general production order.
Now, I have some serious reservations about that assumption, particularly given how broadly the bill defines subscriber information. But let's assume the government is right for a moment. Isn't that an argument for applying the same principle in the other direction? If less sensitive information justifies a lower threshold, then surely more sensitive information — like twenty years of private emails, photographs, messages and documents — should require a substantially higher threshold, more rigorous judicial scrutiny, and stronger safeguards. You can't argue that privacy intrusiveness matters when you're lowering the bar for police, but somehow becomes irrelevant when you're deciding whether to raise it.
Now, more than fifty years ago, Parliament decided that secretly listening to someone's telephone conversations was such an extraordinary invasion of privacy that it required special safeguards. Including authorization by a superior court judge.
But today, an enormous amount of our lives is preserved in digital form, and police can potentially obtain far more revealing information through ordinary search warrants and production orders that don't require those same safeguards.
I think there's something seriously wrong with this picture.
And I think it's time Parliament updated Canada's search and seizure laws to reflect the reality of our digital lives.
I want to talk about the extraordinary amount of information that police can potentially obtain about us, the safeguards that are supposed to protect our privacy, and why I think Parliament needs to substantially reform those safeguards.
And just to be clear from the outset, this isn't about accusing police officers or justices of the peace of routinely abusing their powers. It's about what the law permits, the minimum protections it requires, and whether those protections are still appropriate.
Part 1: Your life, conveniently archived
Let me start with something personal. I've been using email for decades. My main personal email account contains more than twenty years of correspondence.
Emails with my wife, my kids, my parents, my friends, my relatives, my employer, my banker, my insurance broker, and countless other people.
There are serious conversations, professional discussions, family arrangements, sensitive financial matters, and all sorts of personal things.
There are also plenty of stupid jokes and memes that probably made sense at the time.
And that's just email.
Think about everything else we now store online.
Photographs going back twenty years. Every family vacation. Birthday parties. Pictures of the kids growing up. Things we photographed because they were important, funny, embarrassing, or just memorable.
Then there are documents. Notes to myself. Half-finished drafts. Things I've written but never shared with anyone. Ideas I was exploring. Problems I was thinking through.
And then there are our phones.
Our location histories, messaging applications, contacts, browsing histories, calendar entries, searches, and all the little digital breadcrumbs we leave behind.
Some of that information is intensely personal. Some of it may be trivial. But taken together, it can create an extraordinarily detailed picture of an individual.
Who they know. Where they've been. What they believe. What they're worried about. What they're interested in. What they're planning.
Not just today. Potentially over decades.
And a lot of this information doesn't just belong to us in any meaningful sense.
My email inbox contains personal information about everyone who has corresponded with me.
My photographs contain other people.
My messages contain things that friends and family members shared with me in confidence.
Now compare all of that with a traditional telephone wiretap.
Imagine police listening to someone's telephone calls for two weeks.
That's obviously intrusive. They could hear some incredibly private conversations.
But compare two weeks of telephone conversations with twenty years of someone's emails, messages, photographs, documents and online history.
Which one could reveal more about that person's life?
I think the answer is pretty obvious.
And that's the problem I want to explore.
Because our laws still make some very important distinctions based on how the police obtain information, rather than focusing consistently on how much of our private lives they can expose.
Part 2: Parliament understood intrusive surveillance fifty years ago
Let's go back to 1974. That's when Canada's original wiretapping legislation came into force.
Parliament recognized that secretly intercepting people's private communications was an exceptionally intrusive investigative technique.
And it created a special legal regime to govern it.
Today, those provisions are found in Part VI of the Criminal Code, under the heading "Invasion of Privacy."
That heading is rather refreshing, actually. Parliament didn't pretend that secretly listening to someone's telephone conversations wasn't an invasion of privacy.
It acknowledged that it was.
And then it established safeguards.
First, ordinary wiretap authorizations require a superior court judge.
Not just a justice of the peace.
Second, the legislation limits the offences for which these authorizations can be obtained. There's a list of eligible offences in section 183 of the Criminal Code.
Third, the police generally have to demonstrate investigative necessity. In broad terms, they have to show that other investigative techniques have failed, are unlikely to succeed, or that the urgency of the investigation makes relying on them impractical.
There are exceptions, but that's the general framework.
Fourth, the authorizations are subject to time limits and conditions.
And fifth, and this is going to become very important later, the law generally requires the person who was the object of the interception to be notified afterward.
There are provisions allowing notification to be delayed, but Parliament recognized that covert surveillance requires accountability.
Think about the logic behind this.
The greater the intrusion into someone's private life, the greater the justification the police should have to provide, and the more rigorous the independent scrutiny should be.
That's a pretty sensible principle.
But here's where I have a problem in 2026.
We have a different, and potentially much less demanding, framework for obtaining vast amounts of stored digital information.
Part 3: The ordinary production order
Let's talk about section 487.014 of the Criminal Code.
This is the general production order provision.
It allows a police officer or certain other public officers to apply to a justice or judge for an order requiring someone who holds specified documents or data to produce them.
Think of an internet service provider, a telecommunications company, a cloud storage provider, or another business holding information that investigators want.
The police apply for an order. If the order is granted, the recipient is legally required to produce the specified information.
And the application is made ex parte. That's Latin for saying that the application takes place without the participation of the person whose interests may be affected.
The police present their information to the judicial officer. The person whose emails or other records are being sought is generally never there to challenge the application or explain why it might be overly broad.
There are legal requirements, of course. The justice or judge must be satisfied, on information provided under oath, that there are reasonable grounds to believe an offence has been or will be committed, and that the requested documents or data will afford evidence respecting that offence.
That's an important safeguard.
Police can't simply walk into court and demand someone's entire email account because they're curious about it. But I want you to pay attention to something in the wording of section 487.014.
The offence can be an offence under the Criminal Code or any other Act of Parliament. Not necessarily an indictable offence, roughly equivalent to a felony in the US. Not necessarily an offence punishable by imprisonment. Not necessarily a particularly serious offence at all. Wiretaps are limited to serious offences, but that’s not the case with production orders..
Part 4: The criminal mastermind with three dogs
Let's say you visit Ottawa. You're enjoying a lovely afternoon on property managed by the National Capital Commission. You decide to have a picnic somewhere that hasn't been designated for picnicking. Well, depending on the location, you may have contravened federal regulations. Or maybe you decide to play soccer somewhere that isn't designated for soccer. Another federal regulatory offence.
And then there's my favourite. Under the National Capital Commission Animal Regulations, you generally aren't allowed to have more than two domestic animals at one time on certain unleased Commission lands. So imagine someone walking three dogs. Three! Apparently, we're going to need to bring in the tactical unit.
Now, these are real federal regulatory prohibitions. The prescribed ticket fines are generally seventy-five dollars for the soccer and picnic examples, and a hundred dollars for having more than two domestic animals.
I'm not suggesting the police are actually obtaining people's email archives to investigate unauthorized picnics or illicit three-dog outings.
And I'm certainly not suggesting that a court would necessarily uphold an extraordinarily intrusive production order in such circumstances.
My point is more fundamental.
Section 487.014 contains no general offence-seriousness threshold that categorically excludes these minor federal offences.
The same broad statutory language that permits an application to investigate serious crime can potentially support an application involving a comparatively trivial regulatory violation.
Whether the particular order would be lawful is another question.
But why hasn't Parliament drawn clearer lines about which investigative powers should be available for which kinds of offences?
It knew how to do that when it enacted Part VI.
And there's another important difference.
Part 5: Who gets to approve these orders?
Part VI's ordinary wiretap regime requires a superior court judge.
But section 487.014 permits a general production order to be issued by a justice or judge.
And the Criminal Code permits ordinary search warrants to be issued by justices, including eligible justices of the peace.
Now, across Canada, the qualifications for appointment as a justice of the peace vary considerably.
In some jurisdictions, certain justices of the peace must be qualified lawyers.
In others, they don't need to have a law degree or any experience practising law.
Take Ontario. The legislation requires qualifying education or its equivalent, together with substantial work or volunteer experience. But it doesn't require that a newly appointed justice of the peace have attended law school or practised criminal or constitutional law. And it doesn't establish a general prerequisite of technical expertise in computers, cloud storage or digital privacy.
Of course, justices of the peace receive training. And many are extraordinarily capable and experienced. I'm not suggesting otherwise.
But there's a fundamental difference between saying a particular person may be competent to make these decisions and saying the law requires a particular minimum level of relevant expertise.
When someone is being asked to authorize a search that could expose decades of intensely private information, shouldn't we require substantial legal qualifications and appropriate technological training?
I think we should.
And Parliament already makes distinctions between different judicial officers for other intrusive investigative powers.
It did so for wiretaps. It does so for general warrants under section 487.01. (“General warrants” are more intrusive than regular search warrants.)
So the suggestion that particularly intrusive digital searches should also require a provincially or federally appointed judge is hardly revolutionary.
Part 6: The Supreme Court recognizes the problem
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly recognized that digital searches are fundamentally different from traditional searches.
In R. v. Vu, decided in 2013, the Court held that police ordinarily need specific authorization to search computers found while executing a warrant to search a building.
Why? Because a computer isn't simply a filing cabinet with a keyboard.
It can contain an enormous quantity of private information. It can reveal details about someone's life that have no connection whatsoever to the alleged offence.
And the Court specifically recognized the need for the issuing justice to consider those distinctive privacy implications.
In R. v. Bykovets, decided in 2024, the Court recognized that even something as seemingly innocuous as an IP address can be a gateway to highly revealing information about someone's online activities.
But perhaps the most interesting case for our purposes is R. v. Jones, from 2017.
That case involved police obtaining historical text messages from a telecommunications provider using a production order.
The Supreme Court concluded that stored messages could lawfully be obtained through the production-order regime rather than Part VI, provided the police weren't intercepting the communications in transmission.
But Justice Malcolm Rowe, in separate concurring reasons, pointed out something remarkable.
Suppose police intercept a text message at nine in the morning.
They need a Part VI authorization.
But suppose they obtain that very same message from a telecommunications provider at ten in the morning, after it has been delivered and stored.
They can potentially use a production order. Same message. Same private conversation. Very different statutory safeguards. Justice Rowe called that "highly anomalous."
And he questioned whether the production-order requirements adequately protected the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
He didn't decide that issue. His observations were not a binding ruling that the production-order regime is unconstitutional. But I think he identified a fundamental problem.
Why should the level of legal protection depend so heavily on whether the police obtain a communication while it's moving across a network or after it has been stored?
And why should obtaining twenty years of communications necessarily attract less demanding statutory safeguards than intercepting communications over a much shorter period?
I don't think it should.
Part 7: What about completely innocent people?
So far, I've mainly been talking about obtaining information relating to someone the police are investigating.
But there's another issue that concerns me even more.
What happens when the police obtain information about thousands of people who aren't suspected of anything?
In 2016, the Ontario Superior Court issued a very important decision in R. v. Rogers Communications.
The police were operating on the assumption that the perpetrators used cellular devices during or around the commission of the offenses. Their goal was to obtain the logs of all cellular traffic that "pings" particular cell towers near the crime scenes over specific timeframes.
By analyzing this data, investigators hoped to cross-reference multiple crime scenes to pinpoint phone numbers or subscribers whose devices were in close proximity to more than one of the robberies, thereby unmasking suspects who had no known connection to each other otherwise.
Now, that seems to be a legitimate investigative objective.
The problem was the extraordinary breadth of the production orders.
To achieve this identification, the police sought to compel the telecommunications providers to hand over vast swaths of data—including names, home and business addresses, dates of birth, call/text logs, and billing and credit card information. In total, the orders swept up records concerning tens of thousands of entirely innocent subscribers (affecting over 40,000 to 50,000 accounts across carriers) who simply happened to use or pass through the coverage area of the targeted cell towers.
Most of those people weren't suspects. Almost all of them were 100% innocent people, with an expectation of privacy in these records. They were simply people whose phones had connected to particular cellphone towers.
The orders also sought information about people communicating with those subscribers, even when those other people were nowhere near the crime scenes.
This more detailed information could have been requested later if investigators identified a smaller number of possible suspects.
Justice Sproat concluded that the original orders were unreasonably broad and violated section 8 of the Charter.
The orders had already been revoked and replaced with narrower ones before that judgment, but the court addressed the constitutional issues and provided guidance to police and issuing justices.
One of the central principles was incrementalism.
Rather than obtaining enormous collections of personal information about thousands of people, investigators should consider whether a narrower report could identify the handful of potentially relevant records.
In other words, don't demand information about forty thousand people if a much more limited disclosure could accomplish the legitimate investigative purpose.
And this gets to something I think our search laws need to recognize much more clearly.
There's a difference between police obtaining information about someone for whom there is an individualized evidentiary connection to a crime and police obtaining information about thousands of people because one of them might be the person they're looking for.
Both situations may involve legitimate investigations.
But they shouldn't automatically be subject to identical statutory safeguards.
The weaker the connection between an individual and the suspected offence, the stronger the justification should have to be for invading that person's privacy.
And that should be written into the legislation.
Part 8: What if you never know?
Now let me return to something I mentioned at the beginning.
What if the police obtain your personal information through a production order, examine it, and ultimately decide not to lay charges? Almost certainly, you will never know it happened.
There's no general provision in section 487.014 requiring the police to notify the person whose information was obtained.
And in some circumstances, police can obtain an additional order prohibiting the service provider from disclosing the existence of the production order for a specified period.
You might say, well, if the order was unconstitutional, the person can challenge it.
Sure. But how? How do you challenge a search you don't know happened?
How do you assert your Charter rights when nobody tells you that the government obtained your private information?
This isn't just a hypothetical concern.
In R. v. Tse, decided in 2012, the Supreme Court considered emergency powers allowing police to intercept private communications without prior judicial authorization.
The Court recognized that people who aren't prosecuted may never discover that their communications were intercepted and consequently may never have an opportunity to challenge the surveillance.
The lack of adequate accountability safeguards, including notification, was a central reason the provision was found unconstitutional.
Now, Tse concerned warrantless interception, which is different from a production order authorized by a justice or judge.
But the underlying concern is directly relevant.
For many people, the possibility of challenging an unlawful search in criminal court is meaningless because they'll never be charged with anything.
And Parliament recognized the importance of notice in Part VI. Section 196 generally requires the person who was the object of an authorized interception to be notified afterward, subject to statutory exceptions and extensions.
Where's the equivalent general protection for people whose private electronic communications have been obtained through production orders? There isn't one. I think that's a real problem.
Part 9: And what happens to your information afterward?
There's one final issue that deserves attention.
Once police have obtained your personal information, what happens to it?
What if they copied ten years of messages but only a few were relevant to the investigation?
What happens to everything else?
What happens to the personal information of your friends, family members and colleagues?
What happens when the investigation ends without charges?
Well, there's a particularly interesting provision in the Criminal Code.
Section 487.0192, subsection four, expressly states that documents obtained through these production orders are not subject to the ordinary seizure, detention and return provisions in sections 489.1 and 490.
That doesn't mean police are free to keep or use information forever, for any purpose they like.
Other legal restrictions may apply, including privacy legislation, records-management obligations and constitutional limits.
But the production-order provisions themselves don't establish a comprehensive system for deciding when irrelevant digital information must be deleted, when continuing retention requires justification, or when information can be used for another investigation.
And remember, the person affected might never even know that the information was collected.
So they can't realistically ask for it to be returned, deleted, or protected from further use.
This is why I don't think we should focus exclusively on the moment when the production order is issued.
We also need safeguards governing what happens to personal information after the police have obtained it.
Part 10: What should Parliament do?
I think Parliament should revisit the search and seizure provisions of the Criminal Code and apply a fairly straightforward principle.
The more intrusive the investigative power, the stronger the statutory safeguards should be.
And I would propose five specific changes.
First, the most intrusive digital investigative powers should be restricted to sufficiently serious offences.
That doesn't mean police shouldn't be able to investigate minor offences.
It means that obtaining enormous amounts of intimate personal information shouldn't ordinarily be an available investigative technique for a comparatively trivial regulatory violation.
Second, highly intrusive digital searches and production orders should require authorization by provincial court or superior court judges, rather than justices of the peace.
And those judges should have appropriate continuing education in digital privacy and technology.
Third, Parliament should impose special requirements when police seek information about people who aren't individually implicated in the offence.
That could include demonstrating that the information is reasonably necessary, explaining why narrower investigative techniques would be inadequate, and requiring staged disclosure wherever feasible.
Fourth, there should be eventual notification to people whose information has been obtained, with judicially supervised exceptions where notification would genuinely compromise an investigation or create another serious risk.
And fifth, there should be meaningful statutory limits on retention, secondary use and disclosure, together with requirements for deleting information that is no longer lawfully required.
Now, I can already hear some of the objections.
Wouldn't this make investigations more difficult? Potentially, yes.
Would it create more work for judges? Probably.
Would it make sense to require a superior court judge every time police want a routine business record?
No. And that's not what I'm proposing.
We need a graduated system that distinguishes a narrowly targeted request for ordinary records from an application to examine an entire digital archive or collect personal information about thousands of innocent people.
And of course, there need to be appropriate procedures for genuinely urgent investigations.
I'm also not suggesting that justices of the peace are incapable of making sound decisions.
Many of them undoubtedly make excellent decisions every day.
But constitutional safeguards shouldn't depend on whether the particular judicial officer hearing an ex parte application happens to possess specialized expertise that the law never required them to have.
Nor should Parliament rely entirely on police restraint, judicial discretion and the possibility of a subsequent Charter challenge to provide the protection that could be built into the statute from the beginning. If the production order in the Rogers tower dump case hadn’t been overturned, the 49,990 innocent people would not have known their information was snagged by the cops.
Conclusion: Fifty years behind our digital lives
Let's return to where we started.
More than fifty years ago, Parliament recognized that secretly listening to someone's private telephone conversations was an extraordinary exercise of government power.
It established special safeguards because the intrusion was extraordinary.
Today, our phones, computers and cloud accounts contain a level of personal detail that would have been unimaginable when those provisions were introduced.
The police can potentially obtain not just conversations from a particular period, but years or decades of our private lives.
And sometimes they can obtain information about people who aren't suspected of committing any offence at all.
Those people may never be charged. They may never be notified. And they may never get an opportunity to challenge the collection or retention of their information.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the exceptional privacy interests involved in digital searches. But Parliament hasn't updated the safeguards governing the most intrusive uses of ordinary search warrants and production orders to reflect that reality.
I think it's time. If intercepting a few weeks of telephone conversations requires the safeguards Parliament established in Part VI, shouldn't accessing twenty years of someone's digital life require protections at least as demanding? And shouldn't the law provide even stronger safeguards when the information belongs to innocent people who aren't themselves implicated in the offence?
I think the answer to both questions is yes.
Our right to privacy shouldn't depend on whether our personal conversations happen to be travelling over a telephone line or sitting in a cloud account.
And it shouldn't depend on whether we happen to learn that the police obtained our information.
It's time for Canada's search and seizure laws to catch up with the technology that has fundamentally changed our lives.
I'd be interested in what you think.
Should Parliament reserve the most intrusive digital investigative powers for serious offences and require authorization by more experienced judges?
And should people generally be told when the police have obtained their sensitive personal information, even if they're never charged with anything?

