Sunday, November 15, 2026

It's time to update Canada's search & seizure laws - suggestions for reform

 

Did you know that, in Canada, a justice of the peace who has never attended law school can potentially authorize police to obtain years of your private emails, text messages, photographs and other information stored in your online accounts?

And that these investigative powers aren't necessarily reserved for serious crimes such as murder, terrorism, organized crime, or even offences that could send someone to prison?

Under the Criminal Code, some of these powers can potentially be used to investigate relatively trivial federal offences. Things like playing soccer in the wrong place, having a picnic where you're not supposed to, or walking too many dogs in certain federal parks.

And here's another thing. The police can obtain these orders without you knowing about the application. And depending on the circumstances, you might never find out that your personal information was handed over.

And this is particularly relevant to the debate we're having right now over Bill C-22, the federal government's latest lawful access legislation. The government wants police to be able to obtain subscriber information on the lower threshold of "reasonable grounds to suspect," rather than the more demanding "reasonable grounds to believe." And the government's justification is that subscriber information is supposedly less sensitive and less privacy-intrusive than the information obtained through a general production order. 

Now, I have some serious reservations about that assumption, particularly given how broadly the bill defines subscriber information. But let's assume the government is right for a moment. Isn't that an argument for applying the same principle in the other direction? If less sensitive information justifies a lower threshold, then surely more sensitive information — like twenty years of private emails, photographs, messages and documents — should require a substantially higher threshold, more rigorous judicial scrutiny, and stronger safeguards. You can't argue that privacy intrusiveness matters when you're lowering the bar for police, but somehow becomes irrelevant when you're deciding whether to raise it.

Now, more than fifty years ago, Parliament decided that secretly listening to someone's telephone conversations was such an extraordinary invasion of privacy that it required special safeguards. Including authorization by a superior court judge.

But today, an enormous amount of our lives is preserved in digital form, and police can potentially obtain far more revealing information through ordinary search warrants and production orders that don't require those same safeguards.

I think there's something seriously wrong with this picture.

And I think it's time Parliament updated Canada's search and seizure laws to reflect the reality of our digital lives.

I want to talk about the extraordinary amount of information that police can potentially obtain about us, the safeguards that are supposed to protect our privacy, and why I think Parliament needs to substantially reform those safeguards.

And just to be clear from the outset, this isn't about accusing police officers or justices of the peace of routinely abusing their powers. It's about what the law permits, the minimum protections it requires, and whether those protections are still appropriate.

Part 1: Your life, conveniently archived

Let me start with something personal. I've been using email for decades. My main personal email account contains more than twenty years of correspondence.

Emails with my wife, my kids, my parents, my friends, my relatives, my employer, my banker, my insurance broker, and countless other people.

There are serious conversations, professional discussions, family arrangements, sensitive financial matters, and all sorts of personal things.

There are also plenty of stupid jokes and memes that probably made sense at the time.

And that's just email.

Think about everything else we now store online.

Photographs going back twenty years. Every family vacation. Birthday parties. Pictures of the kids growing up. Things we photographed because they were important, funny, embarrassing, or just memorable.

Then there are documents. Notes to myself. Half-finished drafts. Things I've written but never shared with anyone. Ideas I was exploring. Problems I was thinking through.

And then there are our phones.

Our location histories, messaging applications, contacts, browsing histories, calendar entries, searches, and all the little digital breadcrumbs we leave behind.

Some of that information is intensely personal. Some of it may be trivial. But taken together, it can create an extraordinarily detailed picture of an individual.

Who they know. Where they've been. What they believe. What they're worried about. What they're interested in. What they're planning.

Not just today. Potentially over decades.

And a lot of this information doesn't just belong to us in any meaningful sense.

My email inbox contains personal information about everyone who has corresponded with me.

My photographs contain other people.

My messages contain things that friends and family members shared with me in confidence.

Now compare all of that with a traditional telephone wiretap.

Imagine police listening to someone's telephone calls for two weeks.

That's obviously intrusive. They could hear some incredibly private conversations.

But compare two weeks of telephone conversations with twenty years of someone's emails, messages, photographs, documents and online history.

Which one could reveal more about that person's life?

I think the answer is pretty obvious.

And that's the problem I want to explore.

Because our laws still make some very important distinctions based on how the police obtain information, rather than focusing consistently on how much of our private lives they can expose.

Part 2: Parliament understood intrusive surveillance fifty years ago

Let's go back to 1974. That's when Canada's original wiretapping legislation came into force.

Parliament recognized that secretly intercepting people's private communications was an exceptionally intrusive investigative technique.

And it created a special legal regime to govern it.


Today, those provisions are found in Part VI of the Criminal Code, under the heading "Invasion of Privacy."

That heading is rather refreshing, actually. Parliament didn't pretend that secretly listening to someone's telephone conversations wasn't an invasion of privacy.

It acknowledged that it was.

And then it established safeguards.

First, ordinary wiretap authorizations require a superior court judge.

Not just a justice of the peace.

Second, the legislation limits the offences for which these authorizations can be obtained. There's a list of eligible offences in section 183 of the Criminal Code.

Third, the police generally have to demonstrate investigative necessity. In broad terms, they have to show that other investigative techniques have failed, are unlikely to succeed, or that the urgency of the investigation makes relying on them impractical.

There are exceptions, but that's the general framework.

Fourth, the authorizations are subject to time limits and conditions.

And fifth, and this is going to become very important later, the law generally requires the person who was the object of the interception to be notified afterward.

There are provisions allowing notification to be delayed, but Parliament recognized that covert surveillance requires accountability.

Think about the logic behind this.

The greater the intrusion into someone's private life, the greater the justification the police should have to provide, and the more rigorous the independent scrutiny should be.

That's a pretty sensible principle.

But here's where I have a problem in 2026.

We have a different, and potentially much less demanding, framework for obtaining vast amounts of stored digital information.

Part 3: The ordinary production order

Let's talk about section 487.014 of the Criminal Code.

This is the general production order provision.

It allows a police officer or certain other public officers to apply to a justice or judge for an order requiring someone who holds specified documents or data to produce them.

Think of an internet service provider, a telecommunications company, a cloud storage provider, or another business holding information that investigators want.

The police apply for an order. If the order is granted, the recipient is legally required to produce the specified information.

And the application is made ex parte. That's Latin for saying that the application takes place without the participation of the person whose interests may be affected.

The police present their information to the judicial officer. The person whose emails or other records are being sought is generally never there to challenge the application or explain why it might be overly broad.

There are legal requirements, of course. The justice or judge must be satisfied, on information provided under oath, that there are reasonable grounds to believe an offence has been or will be committed, and that the requested documents or data will afford evidence respecting that offence.

That's an important safeguard.

Police can't simply walk into court and demand someone's entire email account because they're curious about it. But I want you to pay attention to something in the wording of section 487.014.

The offence can be an offence under the Criminal Code or any other Act of Parliament. Not necessarily an indictable offence, roughly equivalent to a felony in the US. Not necessarily an offence punishable by imprisonment. Not necessarily a particularly serious offence at all. Wiretaps are limited to serious offences, but that’s not the case with production orders..

Part 4: The criminal mastermind with three dogs

Let's say you visit Ottawa. You're enjoying a lovely afternoon on property managed by the National Capital Commission. You decide to have a picnic somewhere that hasn't been designated for picnicking. Well, depending on the location, you may have contravened federal regulations. Or maybe you decide to play soccer somewhere that isn't designated for soccer. Another federal regulatory offence.

And then there's my favourite. Under the National Capital Commission Animal Regulations, you generally aren't allowed to have more than two domestic animals at one time on certain unleased Commission lands. So imagine someone walking three dogs. Three! Apparently, we're going to need to bring in the tactical unit.

Now, these are real federal regulatory prohibitions. The prescribed ticket fines are generally seventy-five dollars for the soccer and picnic examples, and a hundred dollars for having more than two domestic animals.

I'm not suggesting the police are actually obtaining people's email archives to investigate unauthorized picnics or illicit three-dog outings.

And I'm certainly not suggesting that a court would necessarily uphold an extraordinarily intrusive production order in such circumstances.

My point is more fundamental.

Section 487.014 contains no general offence-seriousness threshold that categorically excludes these minor federal offences.

The same broad statutory language that permits an application to investigate serious crime can potentially support an application involving a comparatively trivial regulatory violation.

Whether the particular order would be lawful is another question.

But why hasn't Parliament drawn clearer lines about which investigative powers should be available for which kinds of offences?

It knew how to do that when it enacted Part VI.

And there's another important difference.

Part 5: Who gets to approve these orders?

Part VI's ordinary wiretap regime requires a superior court judge.

But section 487.014 permits a general production order to be issued by a justice or judge.

And the Criminal Code permits ordinary search warrants to be issued by justices, including eligible justices of the peace.

Now, across Canada, the qualifications for appointment as a justice of the peace vary considerably.

In some jurisdictions, certain justices of the peace must be qualified lawyers.

In others, they don't need to have a law degree or any experience practising law.

Take Ontario. The legislation requires qualifying education or its equivalent, together with substantial work or volunteer experience. But it doesn't require that a newly appointed justice of the peace have attended law school or practised criminal or constitutional law. And it doesn't establish a general prerequisite of technical expertise in computers, cloud storage or digital privacy.

Of course, justices of the peace receive training. And many are extraordinarily capable and experienced. I'm not suggesting otherwise.

But there's a fundamental difference between saying a particular person may be competent to make these decisions and saying the law requires a particular minimum level of relevant expertise.

When someone is being asked to authorize a search that could expose decades of intensely private information, shouldn't we require substantial legal qualifications and appropriate technological training?

I think we should.

And Parliament already makes distinctions between different judicial officers for other intrusive investigative powers.

It did so for wiretaps. It does so for general warrants under section 487.01. (“General warrants” are more intrusive than regular search warrants.)

So the suggestion that particularly intrusive digital searches should also require a provincially or federally appointed judge is hardly revolutionary.

Part 6: The Supreme Court recognizes the problem

The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly recognized that digital searches are fundamentally different from traditional searches.

In R. v. Vu, decided in 2013, the Court held that police ordinarily need specific authorization to search computers found while executing a warrant to search a building.

Why? Because a computer isn't simply a filing cabinet with a keyboard.

It can contain an enormous quantity of private information. It can reveal details about someone's life that have no connection whatsoever to the alleged offence.

And the Court specifically recognized the need for the issuing justice to consider those distinctive privacy implications.

In R. v. Bykovets, decided in 2024, the Court recognized that even something as seemingly innocuous as an IP address can be a gateway to highly revealing information about someone's online activities.

But perhaps the most interesting case for our purposes is R. v. Jones, from 2017.

That case involved police obtaining historical text messages from a telecommunications provider using a production order.

The Supreme Court concluded that stored messages could lawfully be obtained through the production-order regime rather than Part VI, provided the police weren't intercepting the communications in transmission.

But Justice Malcolm Rowe, in separate concurring reasons, pointed out something remarkable.

Suppose police intercept a text message at nine in the morning.

They need a Part VI authorization.

But suppose they obtain that very same message from a telecommunications provider at ten in the morning, after it has been delivered and stored.

They can potentially use a production order. Same message. Same private conversation. Very different statutory safeguards. Justice Rowe called that "highly anomalous."

And he questioned whether the production-order requirements adequately protected the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

He didn't decide that issue. His observations were not a binding ruling that the production-order regime is unconstitutional. But I think he identified a fundamental problem.

Why should the level of legal protection depend so heavily on whether the police obtain a communication while it's moving across a network or after it has been stored?

And why should obtaining twenty years of communications necessarily attract less demanding statutory safeguards than intercepting communications over a much shorter period?

I don't think it should.

Part 7: What about completely innocent people?

So far, I've mainly been talking about obtaining information relating to someone the police are investigating.

But there's another issue that concerns me even more.

What happens when the police obtain information about thousands of people who aren't suspected of anything?

In 2016, the Ontario Superior Court issued a very important decision in R. v. Rogers Communications.

The police were operating on the assumption that the perpetrators used cellular devices during or around the commission of the offenses. Their goal was to obtain the logs of all cellular traffic that "pings" particular cell towers near the crime scenes over specific timeframes. 

By analyzing this data, investigators hoped to cross-reference multiple crime scenes to pinpoint phone numbers or subscribers whose devices were in close proximity to more than one of the robberies, thereby unmasking suspects who had no known connection to each other otherwise.

Now, that seems to be a legitimate investigative objective.

The problem was the extraordinary breadth of the production orders.

To achieve this identification, the police sought to compel the telecommunications providers to hand over vast swaths of data—including names, home and business addresses, dates of birth, call/text logs, and billing and credit card information. In total, the orders swept up records concerning tens of thousands of entirely innocent subscribers (affecting over 40,000 to 50,000 accounts across carriers) who simply happened to use or pass through the coverage area of the targeted cell towers.

Most of those people weren't suspects. Almost all of them were 100% innocent people, with an expectation of privacy in these records. They were simply people whose phones had connected to particular cellphone towers.

The orders also sought information about people communicating with those subscribers, even when those other people were nowhere near the crime scenes.

This more detailed information could have been requested later if investigators identified a smaller number of possible suspects.

Justice Sproat concluded that the original orders were unreasonably broad and violated section 8 of the Charter.

The orders had already been revoked and replaced with narrower ones before that judgment, but the court addressed the constitutional issues and provided guidance to police and issuing justices.

One of the central principles was incrementalism.

Rather than obtaining enormous collections of personal information about thousands of people, investigators should consider whether a narrower report could identify the handful of potentially relevant records.

In other words, don't demand information about forty thousand people if a much more limited disclosure could accomplish the legitimate investigative purpose.

And this gets to something I think our search laws need to recognize much more clearly.

There's a difference between police obtaining information about someone for whom there is an individualized evidentiary connection to a crime and police obtaining information about thousands of people because one of them might be the person they're looking for.

Both situations may involve legitimate investigations.

But they shouldn't automatically be subject to identical statutory safeguards.

The weaker the connection between an individual and the suspected offence, the stronger the justification should have to be for invading that person's privacy.

And that should be written into the legislation.

Part 8: What if you never know?

Now let me return to something I mentioned at the beginning.

What if the police obtain your personal information through a production order, examine it, and ultimately decide not to lay charges? Almost certainly, you will never know it happened.

There's no general provision in section 487.014 requiring the police to notify the person whose information was obtained.

And in some circumstances, police can obtain an additional order prohibiting the service provider from disclosing the existence of the production order for a specified period.

You might say, well, if the order was unconstitutional, the person can challenge it.

Sure. But how? How do you challenge a search you don't know happened?

How do you assert your Charter rights when nobody tells you that the government obtained your private information?

This isn't just a hypothetical concern.

In R. v. Tse, decided in 2012, the Supreme Court considered emergency powers allowing police to intercept private communications without prior judicial authorization.

The Court recognized that people who aren't prosecuted may never discover that their communications were intercepted and consequently may never have an opportunity to challenge the surveillance.

The lack of adequate accountability safeguards, including notification, was a central reason the provision was found unconstitutional.

Now, Tse concerned warrantless interception, which is different from a production order authorized by a justice or judge.

But the underlying concern is directly relevant.

For many people, the possibility of challenging an unlawful search in criminal court is meaningless because they'll never be charged with anything.

And Parliament recognized the importance of notice in Part VI. Section 196 generally requires the person who was the object of an authorized interception to be notified afterward, subject to statutory exceptions and extensions.

Where's the equivalent general protection for people whose private electronic communications have been obtained through production orders? There isn't one. I think that's a real problem.

Part 9: And what happens to your information afterward?

There's one final issue that deserves attention.

Once police have obtained your personal information, what happens to it?

What if they copied ten years of messages but only a few were relevant to the investigation?

What happens to everything else?

What happens to the personal information of your friends, family members and colleagues?

What happens when the investigation ends without charges?

Well, there's a particularly interesting provision in the Criminal Code.

Section 487.0192, subsection four, expressly states that documents obtained through these production orders are not subject to the ordinary seizure, detention and return provisions in sections 489.1 and 490.

That doesn't mean police are free to keep or use information forever, for any purpose they like.

Other legal restrictions may apply, including privacy legislation, records-management obligations and constitutional limits.

But the production-order provisions themselves don't establish a comprehensive system for deciding when irrelevant digital information must be deleted, when continuing retention requires justification, or when information can be used for another investigation.

And remember, the person affected might never even know that the information was collected.

So they can't realistically ask for it to be returned, deleted, or protected from further use.

This is why I don't think we should focus exclusively on the moment when the production order is issued.

We also need safeguards governing what happens to personal information after the police have obtained it.

Part 10: What should Parliament do?

I think Parliament should revisit the search and seizure provisions of the Criminal Code and apply a fairly straightforward principle.

The more intrusive the investigative power, the stronger the statutory safeguards should be.

And I would propose five specific changes.

First, the most intrusive digital investigative powers should be restricted to sufficiently serious offences.

That doesn't mean police shouldn't be able to investigate minor offences.

It means that obtaining enormous amounts of intimate personal information shouldn't ordinarily be an available investigative technique for a comparatively trivial regulatory violation.

Second, highly intrusive digital searches and production orders should require authorization by provincial court or superior court judges, rather than justices of the peace.

And those judges should have appropriate continuing education in digital privacy and technology.

Third, Parliament should impose special requirements when police seek information about people who aren't individually implicated in the offence.

That could include demonstrating that the information is reasonably necessary, explaining why narrower investigative techniques would be inadequate, and requiring staged disclosure wherever feasible.

Fourth, there should be eventual notification to people whose information has been obtained, with judicially supervised exceptions where notification would genuinely compromise an investigation or create another serious risk.

And fifth, there should be meaningful statutory limits on retention, secondary use and disclosure, together with requirements for deleting information that is no longer lawfully required.

Now, I can already hear some of the objections.

Wouldn't this make investigations more difficult? Potentially, yes.

Would it create more work for judges? Probably.

Would it make sense to require a superior court judge every time police want a routine business record?

No. And that's not what I'm proposing.

We need a graduated system that distinguishes a narrowly targeted request for ordinary records from an application to examine an entire digital archive or collect personal information about thousands of innocent people.

And of course, there need to be appropriate procedures for genuinely urgent investigations.

I'm also not suggesting that justices of the peace are incapable of making sound decisions.

Many of them undoubtedly make excellent decisions every day.

But constitutional safeguards shouldn't depend on whether the particular judicial officer hearing an ex parte application happens to possess specialized expertise that the law never required them to have.

Nor should Parliament rely entirely on police restraint, judicial discretion and the possibility of a subsequent Charter challenge to provide the protection that could be built into the statute from the beginning. If the production order in the Rogers tower dump case hadn’t been overturned, the 49,990 innocent people would not have known their information was snagged by the cops. 

Conclusion: Fifty years behind our digital lives

Let's return to where we started.

More than fifty years ago, Parliament recognized that secretly listening to someone's private telephone conversations was an extraordinary exercise of government power.

It established special safeguards because the intrusion was extraordinary.

Today, our phones, computers and cloud accounts contain a level of personal detail that would have been unimaginable when those provisions were introduced.

The police can potentially obtain not just conversations from a particular period, but years or decades of our private lives.

And sometimes they can obtain information about people who aren't suspected of committing any offence at all.

Those people may never be charged. They may never be notified. And they may never get an opportunity to challenge the collection or retention of their information.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the exceptional privacy interests involved in digital searches. But Parliament hasn't updated the safeguards governing the most intrusive uses of ordinary search warrants and production orders to reflect that reality.

I think it's time. If intercepting a few weeks of telephone conversations requires the safeguards Parliament established in Part VI, shouldn't accessing twenty years of someone's digital life require protections at least as demanding? And shouldn't the law provide even stronger safeguards when the information belongs to innocent people who aren't themselves implicated in the offence?

I think the answer to both questions is yes.

Our right to privacy shouldn't depend on whether our personal conversations happen to be travelling over a telephone line or sitting in a cloud account.

And it shouldn't depend on whether we happen to learn that the police obtained our information.

It's time for Canada's search and seizure laws to catch up with the technology that has fundamentally changed our lives.

I'd be interested in what you think.

Should Parliament reserve the most intrusive digital investigative powers for serious offences and require authorization by more experienced judges?

And should people generally be told when the police have obtained their sensitive personal information, even if they're never charged with anything?

Monday, October 26, 2026

Canada's New Children's Privacy Code

 

This shouldn’t be a radical idea. A seventeen-year-old young person is different from a seven-year-old child, who are both different from a three year old toddler. When we're talking about children's privacy, online safety, and their ability to make decisions about their own personal information, we should recognize those differences.

And that’s baked into Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s new Children's Privacy Code, released on October 20, 2026.

It's a substantial document setting out the OPC’s views on how businesses should collect, use, and disclose the personal information of children and young people.

And I think there's a lot to like about it.

It emphasizes that children have privacy rights of their own. It recognizes that children develop greater independence and decision-making capacity as they mature. And it says that online services should be designed to protect children's privacy without preventing them from participating in the digital world.

This is particularly interesting at a time when governments are proposing increasingly blunt measures to “protect” young people online, including outright restrictions on access to social media.

And there's another interesting wrinkle. The Commissioner's recognition that meaningful consent needs to account for an individual's capacity seems to sit a little awkwardly alongside the arguments his office has been making before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Facebook privacy case. I'll get to that.

In this episode, I'm going to explain where this new Code came from, what it says, what it means for businesses and young people, and why I think its underlying philosophy is particularly important.

And I'll point out some legal questions and a few inconsistencies along the way.

What exactly is a Children's Privacy Code?

This is not a new law. Parliament hasn't passed a Children's Privacy Act. And the Commissioner hasn't suddenly acquired the authority to impose new legal obligations simply by publishing a document.

What we're looking at is regulatory guidance. The Code sets out the Privacy Commissioner's interpretation of how Canada's existing private-sector privacy law, PIPEDA, applies when businesses collect, use, and disclose children's personal information.

PIPEDA is the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. It has been Canada's federal private-sector privacy law since 2001.

It establishes broad principles covering consent, appropriate purposes, limits on collection, safeguards, access to personal information, and accountability. But PIPEDA doesn't really distinguish between adults and children. And it doesn't contain a special set of children's privacy rights.

The Commissioner has therefore taken existing legal requirements and developed guidance for applying them to young people. This is significant, but we need to understand its limitations.

For example, the Code repeatedly says organizations must do certain things.

Sometimes that's a fair reflection of obligations already imposed by PIPEDA. Other times, the Code is setting out the Commissioner's interpretation of what compliance requires. Those are not necessarily the same thing.

A regulator's interpretation of the law can be persuasive, and it can tell businesses what to expect during investigations. But it doesn't have the same legal force as legislation, and ultimately the courts determine what PIPEDA requires. So it's important not to confuse the Privacy Commissioner's expectations with new statutory requirements. In short, if you follow the code, you’re likely to stay on the Commissioner’s good side.

Where did this come from?

The Children's Privacy Code didn't appear out of nowhere. For several years, privacy regulators around the world have been paying increasing attention to the particular challenges children face online.

The United Kingdom has its Age Appropriate Design Code, which is probably one of the best-known examples. Ireland has developed children's data protection guidance, and jurisdictions including California have adopted or proposed additional requirements for online services used by children.

There's also an international human rights dimension. Canada ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1991. That Convention recognizes that children have rights of their own, including a right to privacy. It also emphasizes their best interests, their right to participate in decisions affecting them, and their evolving capacities.

In 2021, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child published guidance explaining how those rights apply in digital environments.

Canadian courts have also repeatedly recognized that young people deserve particular privacy protections.

In A.B. v. Bragg Communications, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent vulnerability of children and the importance of their privacy.

And in R. v. Jarvis, the Court recognized that Canadian law often provides children with greater privacy protections than adults.

Against that background, the Privacy Commissioner launched a consultation process to develop a Canadian Children's Privacy Code. That exploratory consultation concluded in August 2025.

The Commissioner also sought input from young people, including through a Youth Council consisting of students aged fourteen to seventeen.

And I think that deserves some credit. If you're going to develop rules that affect how young people use technology, you really should talk to young people.

According to the Commissioner, some of their biggest concerns were the lack of control over their information, the lack of meaningful choice, and the difficulty understanding what companies were doing with their data. 

Young people definitely weren't asking to be excluded from the internet. They wanted greater control over how they participated in it. And that takes us to what I consider the most important part of the Code.

Children are not all the same

The Code expressly recognizes that children under eighteen are not a homogeneous group.

That's an important point.

A five-year-old, a twelve-year-old, and a seventeen-year-old can have radically different abilities to understand information, assess risks, and make decisions.

And children don't suddenly acquire the ability to exercise privacy rights at midnight on their eighteenth birthday. They develop that ability over time. The Code calls this evolving capacity.

Younger children generally require greater protection and more involvement from parents or guardians.

As they grow older, they should be given increasing autonomy over their personal information.

The Code actually provides a table dividing childhood into five developmental stages.



For children from birth to age five, it contemplates parental consent.

For children aged six to nine, parental consent remains necessary, but they should also receive simple written or visual explanations.

For children ten to twelve, the expectation is parental consent along with information directed to the child.

At thirteen to fifteen, the Code contemplates consent from the young person themselves.

And for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, again, the young person generally provides their own consent.

But these categories aren't supposed to be a mechanical substitute for considering capacity.

The Code says that, for children thirteen and older, organizations should consider whether the young person can understand the particular decision they're being asked to make. And that assessment should account for the sensitivity of the personal information and the potential consequences.

That makes sense. Consider a fourteen-year-old signing up for an online chess club.

Maybe the service needs a username, an email address, and a password. That's one thing.

Now consider the same fourteen-year-old being asked to consent to the continuous collection of precise location information, detailed behavioural profiling, and disclosure of that information to advertising companies. Those are very different privacy decisions.

A young person might be perfectly capable of understanding one while struggling to appreciate all the implications of the other. And importantly, greater maturity should mean greater autonomy, not simply fewer rights.

The Code recognizes that privacy protections and parental involvement should be adjusted as children become more capable of making their own decisions.

I particularly like the idea of guided autonomy.

Parents have an important role, but they shouldn't necessarily be able to control every aspect of their teenager's digital life. And businesses shouldn't outsource responsibility for privacy protection to parents by assuming that parental controls solve everything.

Children are rights-holders in their own right. That includes the right to some privacy from their parents.

That's a more sophisticated approach than simply saying everybody under eighteen needs adult supervision at all times.

What businesses are expected to do

Now let's look at the practical requirements.

The Code contains seven main expectations, along with a discussion of practices the Commissioner considers unacceptable. And some of these expectations probably should inform how online services are designed.

First: meaningful consent.

Consent mechanisms have to be understandable to the children who are using them.

You can't simply take a twenty-page privacy policy written by lawyers for lawyers, put an "I agree" button at the bottom, and assume a twelve-year-old has meaningfully consented. Actually, you probably shouldn't be doing that to adults either.

The Code says optional uses of personal information should require express, opt-in consent. If an app wants to collect information to deliver its essential service, that's one question. If it also wants to collect additional information for personalization, analytics, or other optional features, those choices should be presented separately. And businesses shouldn't penalize children for declining optional data collection.

They also have to make it easy to withdraw consent.

Second: privacy impact assessments.

The Commissioner encourages organizations to assess the privacy risks of their services, especially when those services involve higher-risk activities.

This means looking at what information is collected, why it's needed, how it could be misused, and what consequences that misuse could have for young people. It's a privacy-by-design approach.

Ideally, those questions are asked before the product launches, not after something goes wrong.

Third: high privacy settings by default.

This is a particularly important recommendation. Children shouldn't have to go hunting through complicated settings menus to turn on privacy protections.

The protections should already be enabled. For example, precise location sharing should be turned off by default. Profiles shouldn't automatically be visible to the entire internet. Third-party sharing should be off unless appropriate consent is obtained. And profiling should also be off by default.

The underlying philosophy is simple: a child shouldn't have to understand every possible privacy risk before the service becomes reasonably safe to use.

Fourth: data minimization.

Businesses should only collect the personal information they actually need to provide the service.

Not everything that might be useful someday. Not everything that might be commercially valuable. And not everything that might help the marketing department develop a more detailed profile.

If an online game works perfectly well with a username, it probably doesn't need a child's real name, home address, precise location, and complete contact list. The Code also emphasizes that information shouldn't be retained longer than necessary.

And because children develop and change so quickly, companies should consider what happens to information collected during childhood as those children mature and become adults.

Fifth: transparency.

Privacy notices have to be understandable to their intended audience. And that means more than simply making them shorter. Information should be presented at appropriate times, in language and formats suitable for the young people using the service.

A thirteen-year-old might understand a relatively straightforward explanation of how recommendations are generated. A seven-year-old might need something much simpler, perhaps with illustrations. 

The important thing is that the explanation is genuinely understandable. 

The Commissioner’s report has some interesting examples of how to communicate privacy related choices to kids. 

Sixth: correction and deletion.

The Code says young people should have practical ways to correct inaccurate personal information and request its deletion. This is especially important when we're talking about things that people shared when they were children. Something that seemed funny or important when someone was eleven may be embarrassing, misleading, or completely irrelevant by the time they're seventeen.

And young people should have some meaningful ability to move beyond their digital history.

The Commissioner wants businesses to make correction and deletion processes easy to find and use.

There are legal questions about the extent to which PIPEDA creates an enforceable deletion right, but the underlying policy objective makes sense.

Seventh: avoiding profiling.

This is one of the most consequential parts of the Code.

The Commissioner says businesses should not use children's personal information for behavioural advertising or other forms of commercial profiling that exploit their vulnerabilities.

That means collecting information about what a child clicks on, watches, searches for, and interacts with, then using that information to infer their interests and target them with advertising.

The Code is particularly concerned about profiling through artificial intelligence.

AI systems can identify patterns and infer things about people that they haven't explicitly disclosed.

And when those systems are used to influence the behaviour of young people, there are significant privacy concerns.

The Code isn't saying that all personalization is prohibited.

There may be legitimate reasons to adapt a service to a child's needs.

But the question has to be whether the practice is genuinely in the child's best interests, not simply whether it increases engagement or advertising revenue.

Some things the Commissioner says consent cannot fix

The Code goes further than simply asking businesses to improve their consent processes.

It identifies certain practices that the Commissioner considers fundamentally incompatible with children's privacy and best interests. These include deceptive design patterns, sometimes called dark patterns.

For example, an interface might make the option to share information bright, colourful, and easy to select, while burying the privacy-protective option behind several additional screens.

Or a service might pressure a child into disclosing information by suggesting they'll lose access, miss out on rewards, or disappoint their friends.

The Code also addresses engagement mechanisms, including points, streaks, and social pressure, when they're deliberately used to generate additional opportunities to collect personal information.

And it takes aim at emotional profiling. The Commissioner uses the following example: Imagine a platform inferring that a child is feeling lonely, insecure, or anxious and then using that information to persuade them to disclose more personal information.

The Commissioner considers that to be exploitative and unacceptable.

The Facebook consent problem

Now, I want to return to something I mentioned at the beginning.

There's an interesting tension between this Code and the position that the Privacy Commissioner has taken in the Facebook litigation. (Canadian Privacy Law Blog: Appeal court reverses Facebook’s Canadian privacy win)

You probably remember the Cambridge Analytica scandal.

Facebook allowed third-party applications to access personal information through its platform, and information relating to hundreds of thousands of Canadians was potentially disclosed through the application at the centre of that scandal.

The Privacy Commissioner concluded that Facebook had failed to obtain meaningful consent and had failed to provide adequate safeguards.

The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada.

One of the central issues is how courts should determine whether meaningful consent has actually been obtained.

Under section 6.1 of PIPEDA, consent is only valid if it is reasonable to expect that the individual would understand the nature, purpose, and consequences of the collection, use, or disclosure.

The court below noted that the Commissioner didn’t lead any evidence on what a Facebook user would have understood at the time. The Commissioner said that wasn’t relevant. It’s an objective standard and doesn't have to do with what an actual Facebook user would have understood. 

I get that you don't want compliance with privacy law to depend entirely on the subjective recollections or knowledge of millions of individual users. But the new Children's Privacy Code says that meaningful consent needs to be calibrated to the age, maturity, and developing capacity of the person providing it.

It expressly recognizes that children are not all capable of understanding the same things.

And it says that a particular child may have sufficient capacity to consent to one data practice, but not necessarily another. So clearly you need to understand the actual characteristics and capacities of the people providing consent..

Now, to be fair, those positions aren't necessarily irreconcilable.

An objective test can be contextual.

We can ask what a reasonable thirteen-year-old would understand, rather than what a reasonable adult would understand.

And we can recognize that certain categories of people have particular characteristics without requiring proof of what every individual actually knew.

I wouldn't go so far as to say the Commissioner has contradicted himself.

And I'll be interested to see how the Supreme Court ultimately addresses meaningful consent.

A better alternative to banning young people from the internet?

There's another reason I find this Code interesting.

At the same time the Privacy Commissioner is emphasizing children's autonomy and their right to participate in digital life, governments have been considering restrictions that would prevent young people below a certain age from accessing social media services. 

I've talked about Canada's proposed Safe Social Media Act, Bill C-34, in previous episodes.

One of my fundamental objections to broad social media bans is that they treat young people as a homogeneous group.

They assume that everyone below a particular age should be excluded, regardless of maturity, circumstances, or the benefits they might obtain from participating.

And those benefits can be substantial.

Young people use online services to learn, communicate, develop friendships, participate in communities, express themselves, and access information.

For some young people, particularly those who are isolated or marginalized, those opportunities can be especially important.

The Privacy Commissioner's Code recognizes that participation in digital life isn't some optional luxury. It's just part of ordinary life.

And the Code's stated objective isn't to prevent children from participating.

It's to make participation more privacy-protective and appropriate to their developing capacities.

I think that's a good starting point.

Instead of asking how we can exclude young people from portions of the internet, we should be asking how we can make online services safer while respecting their rights.

Of course, privacy is only one part of online safety.

This Code doesn't try to solve all the other problems.

And perhaps that should inform the broader debate about online safety legislation.

What happens next?

So where does this leave us? The Children's Privacy Code was released on October 20, 2026.

Although the document has been published as the Code, the Privacy Commissioner's office is still accepting feedback until January 20, 2027.

It may be updated in response to that feedback.

The Commissioner has also indicated that additional, more specific guidance may follow.

For businesses, the practical message is that children's privacy is clearly an enforcement priority for the Commissioner.

Conclusion

Overall, I think the Privacy Commissioner's Children's Privacy Code is a welcome development.

It's not legislation, and much of it goes beyond what’s written in and required by PIPEDA.

But I support its underlying philosophy.

Children have privacy rights.

Those rights don't belong exclusively to their parents.

Young people develop greater capacity and autonomy as they mature.

And protecting their privacy should be about empowering them to participate safely in digital life, rather than excluding them from it.

That's a more thoughtful approach than treating every person under eighteen as incapable of making decisions for themselves.

And perhaps, when we're debating children's online safety more broadly, we could use a little more of that nuance.